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ABSTRACT
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Directed by: Professor Susan Krauss Whitbourne
The stability and change of adult personality is one of the most enduring questions in
psychology. This study utilized longitudinal data on three cohorts of men and women
spanning 34 years to examine Erikson’s (1963) eight-stage theory of personality using
the Inventory of Psychosocial Development (IPD), an 80-item Likert-type self-report
measure. Cohort 1 (N = 106) was first tested in 1966 at age 20 and has been re-tested in
1977, 1988, and 2000 at the ages of 31, 42, and 54, respectively. Cohort 2 (N = 73) was
first tested in 1977 at age 20 and has been re-tested in 1988 and 2000 at the ages of 3
1
and 42, respectively. Cohort 3 (N = 55) was first tested in 1988 at age 20 and has been
re-tested in 2000 at age 3 1 . Joining a substantial body of trait personality research,
mean-level and rank-order stability estimates suggest personality goes through
significant age-related changes in the decade of the 20s, fewer changes in the decade of
30s, and virtually no change in the decade of the 40s, providing convincing evidence
that personality stabilizes in middle adulthood. It is concluded that researchers should
transcend the historically polarized stability versus change debate to examine the













I. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Inlroduclion
1
The Psychosocial Maturity Hypothesis 3
The Psychosocial Maturity Hypothesis: Additional Support 7
The Present Study 12





Procedure . . . : 20
III. STATISICAL ANALYSES 23
Results 23
Multivariate analyses of variance (MANOV As) 24









Summary of Significant Effects Across Stages
vii
IV. RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS AND CONTEXTUAL DISCUSSION 40
Discussion 40
Limitations of the Study 51
Future Research 55
APPENDICES
A. STUDY TABLES 58





1. Designs of Multivariate Analyses Comparing Ages and Cohorts 58
2. Means and Standard Deviations of IPD Stage Scores by Cohort and
Time of Testing 59
3. Stability Coefficients on the IPD for All Cohorts Across All Ages Tested .... 60
4. Results of Multivariate Analyses Comparing Age, Cohort, and
Time of Testing 61





1. Erikson’s (1963) epigenetic matrix including stage numbers and
the psychosocial crises they represent 67
2. Design of the present study 68
3. Cohort 1 means for Trust versus Mistrust on the IPD 69
4. Cohort 1 means for Autonomy versus Shame and Doubt on the IPD 69
5. Cohort 1 means for Initiative versus Guilt on the IPD 70
6. Cohort 1 means for Industry versus Inferiority on the IPD 70
7. Cohort 1 means for Identity versus Identity Diffusion on the IPD 71
8. Cohort 1 means for Intimacy versus Isolation on the IPD 71
9. Cohort I means for Generativity versus Stagnation on the IPD 72
10. Cohort 1 means for Ego Integrity versus Despair on the IPD 72
1 1 . Trust versus Mistrust means on the IPD by cohort from 1988 to 2000 73
12. Autonomy versus Shame and Doubt on the IPD by cohort from 1988 to 73
2000
13. Initiative versus Guilt on the IPD by cohort from 1988 to 2000 74
14. Industry versus Inferiority on the IPD by cohort from 1988 to 2000 74
15. Identity versus Identity Diffusion on the IPD by cohort from 75
1988 to 2000
16. Intimacy versus Isolation on the IPD by cohort from 1988 to 2000 75
17. Generativity versus Stagnation on the IPD by cohort from 1988 to 2000 76
18. Ego integrity versus Despair on the IPD by cohort from 1988 to 2000 76
19. Trust versus Mistrust means by cohort and year of testing for ages 20-31
on the IPD 77
20. Autonomy versus Shame and Doubt means by cohort and year of testing
for ages 20-31 on the IPD 77
21
. Initiative versus Guilt means by cohort and year of testing for ages 20-31
on the IPD 78
22 . Industry versus Inferiority means by cohort and year of testing for
ages 20-31 on the IPD 78
23. Identity versus Identity Diffusion means by cohort and year of testing for
ages 20-31 on the IPD 79
24. Intimacy versus Isolation means by cohort and year of testing for
ages 20-31 on the IPD 79
25. Generativity versus Stagnation means by cohort and year of testing for
ages 20-31 on the IPD 80
26. Ego Integrity versus Despair means by cohort and year of testing for
ages 20-31 on the IPD 80
27. Trust versus Mistrust means on the IPD for Cohorts 1 and 2 for the age
range 20 -42 81
28. Autonomy versus Shame and Doubt means on the IPD for Cohorts 1 and 2
for the age range 20-42 81
29. Initiative versus Guilt means on the IPD for Cohorts 1 and 2 for the age
range 20 -42 82
30. Industry versus Inferiority means on the IPD for Cohorts 1 and 2
for the age range 20-42
3 1 . Identity versus Identity Diffusion means on the IPD for Cohorts 1 and 2
for the age range 20-42
32. Intimacy versus Isolation means on the IPD for Cohorts 1 and 2
for the age range 20-42
XI
33. Generativity versus Stagnation means on the IPD for Cohorts 1 and 2
for the age range 20-42 84
34. Ego integrity versus Despair means on the IPD for Cohorts 1 and 2
for the age range 20-42 84
xii
CHAPTER I
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
Over a century ago, William James (1890) proclaimed, “In most of us, by the age
of thirty, the character has set like plaster, and will never soften again” (p. 126). In the
ensuing decades, personality researchers have debated whether personality remains
stable or changes in adulthood. On the one hand, trait personality theorists argue that
personality is basically a set of stable and enduring dispositions that remain stable
throughout the life span. On the other hand, adult developmental psychologists citing the
stage models of Erikson (1963) and Loevinger (1976) argue that personality changes
predictably over the life course and that the interaction of personality and environment is
critical in that development.
James’ proposition raises two questions. The first question asks whether or not
personality in adulthood is stable. The second question asks when in adulthood
personality becomes stable. Consistent with James, Costa and McCrae (1994; 1997)
concluded that research on the Five Factor model supports the proposition that
personality development stops at age 30. According to these researchers, cross-sectional
studies yield impressively consistent results; young adults score slightly higher than
middle age adults do on Neuroticism (worry). Extraversion (social interaction), and
Openness to Experience (desire for novelty), and slightly lower than middle age adults
on Conscientiousness (achievement striving) and Agreeableness (nurturance).
However, this view seems to be changing. McCrae, et al. (1999) examined mean-
level stability of the “Big Five in a cross-cultural study of over 7,000 participants in four
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distinct age groups (i.e., 18-21, 22-29, 30-49, and 50 f) from Germany, Italy, Portugal,
Croatia, and South Korea. Consistent with previous findings, older adults were lower on
Extraversion and Openness to Experience and higher on Agreeableness and
Conscientiousness than young adult samples. Also, consistent with previous research,
Neuroticism was generally higher in young adults than it was in older adults Thus,
middle age adults in these cross-cultural samples were more nurturing, hard working,
and less emotionally volatile, out going, and curious than their younger counterparts.
McCrae and his colleagues concluded that these cross-cultural maturational changes in
adult personality indicate a universal trend toward psychosocial maturity over the life
span. They further concluded that these cross-sectional differences probably reflect
“slow maturational processes continuing after age 30 (McCrae et al., 1999, p .475).”
Recent cross-cultural research has paralleled these findings (Labouvie-Vief,
Diehl, Tamowski, & Shen, 2000). In this study, California Personality Inventory scores
were compared in cross-sectional samples of adults from the United States (N = 285)
and the People’s Republic of China (N = 450) ranging in age from 20 to 87. Older adults
were scored higher on CPI scales related to Conscientious and Agreeableness and lower
on CPI scales related to extraversion Importantly, these authors observed that instead of
personality development stopping at age 30, “age difterences continue to hold across the
adult life span and into late life” (Labouvie-Vief et al., 2000, p PI 4). These results
suggest continued personality development across the adult life span across cultures.
Roberts and DelVecchio (2000) conducted an extensive quantitative review to
examine the hypothesis that adult personality stabilizes at age 50. These researchers
examined rank-order consistency (i.e., the relative placement of individuals
within a
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group) in 152 studies based on 124 samples consisting of 54,180 participants. This
procedure yielded 3, 217 rank-order consistency coefficients. Results were consistent
with the age 50 hypothesis showing substantial change well into middle adulthood.
Specifically, test-retest correlations increased from childhood (.31) to college age (.54)
and again from college age to age 30 (.64). They further increases in rank-order
consistency from .64 at age 30 to .75 between the ages of 50 and 70. Although these
findings do not support the age 30 hypothesis,” they do support the alternative age 50
hypothesis. However, given that rank-order consistency estimates increased with age but
did not reach unity suggests there is considerable room for personality change in
adulthood.
The Psychosocial Maturity Hypothesis
In contrast to the stability view, Erikson (1963) postulated that personality
changes predictably over the life span according to a set of eight bipolar psychosocial
crises (see Figure 1; Appendix B). Complimentary pairs of positive and negative ego
qualities characterize the crisis stages, which are determined conjointly by biological,
psychological, and sociocultural forces. The successful resolution of each crisis stage is
associated with the development of a basic ego strength. As the crises are successfully
resolved, these strengths accumulate and are continuously integrated into personality.
This allows the individual to undertake upcoming crises with greater resolve. For
example, successful resolution of Stage 1 (trust versus mistrust) results in the
development of hope, which paves the way for the infant to take on the challenges
associated with Stage 2 (autonomy versus shame and doubt). Conversely, unsuccessful
resolution of Stage 1 results in withdrawal.
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In Erikson’s theory, the successful resolution of earlier crises provides the
foundation for successful resolution of later crises, a process he referred to as the
epigenetic unfolding of personality. However, it would be a mistake to interpret
Erikson’s postulate of epigenetic development as a strictly unidirectional path. Erikson
believed that all of the empty boxes that form the epigenetic matrix must be thought
through while keeping in mind “the total configuration of stages” (Erikson, 1963, p.
272). The total configuration or overall positive developmental progression is referred to
here as psychosocial maturity, while the analysis of the “empty” boxes refers to the idea
that the psychosocial crisis stages are never completely resolved. Instead, these crises
are continually revisited throughout life and subject to influence from changing
environmental conditions. It is also the case that each of the psychosocial crises can
reach ascendancy at any time in adulthood depending on the “hazards of existence”
(Erikson, 1963, p.274). That is, earlier stages can ascend in later life and later stages
arise in early adulthood depending on the biopsychosocial forces at work.
Stability in adult personality is expected from trait personality research because
traits are by definition stable and the measures used to assess trait dimensions are biased
toward stability (Helson & Stewart, 1994). Research that is theoretically guided by
Erikson’s model, however, might be better able to detect personality change in
adulthood. Utilizing a cohort-sequential design (Bakes, 1968; Schaie, 1965), which
combines the benefits of both longitudinal and cross-sectional research, Whitbourne and
her colleagues (Whitbourne & Waterman, 1979; Whitbourne, Zuschlag, Elliot, &
Waterman, 1992) have conducted the most direct and extensive test of Erikson’s 8-stage
theory. These studies are based on Constantinople’s (1969) original investigation
in
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which she developed the Inventory of Psychosocial Development (IPD), a Likert-type
self-report measure of Stages 1-6. Making both cross-sectional and longitudinal
comparisons of college students at the University of Rochester, Constantinople observed
that seniors showed greater crisis resolution than freshman, and greater psychosocial
crisis resolution of stages 4, 5, and 6 was associated with progression through college.
Constantinople also observed that men showed a clearer pattern of increasing
psychosocial maturity as their scores increasingly significantly on the positive resolution
of Stages 4 and 5 from freshman to senior year, whereas women’s scores did not.
However, women initially scored higher than men did on Stages 4, 5, and 6 as freshman
in college; there were no differences between men and women after 4-years of college.
Whitboume and Waterman (1979) conducted a 10-year follow-up (1966-1977)
of these data utilizing a partial sequential design in an effort to control for the inherent
confounds of both time of testing and cohort in longitudinal and cross-sectional research,
respectively. Participants originally tested in 1966 (Cohort 1) were re-tested in a ten-year
follow-up. At the same time, a new sample of undergraduates attending college in 1977
were also tested (Cohort 2). Again, the findings obtained in this study were consistent
with Erikson’s theory. Specifically, significant increases were observed between the
1966 and 1977 testing for Cohort 1 on Stages 4, 5, and 6. A significant cross-sectional
difference was observed between Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 on Stage 4, and trends were
observed in the same direction for Stages 5 and 6. Time lag comparisons revealed that
Cohort 2 college students scored higher on Stage 4 than Cohort 1 participants when they
were in college. There were also differential patterns of psychosocial crisis resolution
between the men and women of Cohorts 1 and 2. Cohort 1 women scored lower overall
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between the men and women of Cohorts 1 and 2. Cohort 1 women scored lower overall
than Cohort 1 men in 1966 and Cohort 2 women scored higher overall than Cohort 2
men in 1977.
Whitboume et al. (1992) conducted a 22-year follow-up study utilizing a full
cohort-sequential strategy as data were collected on three cohorts of men and women in
1966, 1977, and 1988. For the first time, data were presented on the last two stages of
the IPD as these were added to the original measure in the 1977 testing. Cohorts 1 and 2
showed evidence of increased psychosocial resolution for Stages 1, 5, and 6, which
suggested that ontogenetic developmental trends, rather than environmental influence,
were responsible for these changes. Parallel increases in Stage 4 resolution were also
observed for Cohorts 1 and 2 between the ages of 20 and 3 1 , which again suggests age-
related change. However, this finding is complicated by the fact that Cohort 1 had
unusually low Stage 4 scores in 1966. Cohort 1 also showed increases on Stages 2 and 3,
and decreases on Stage 8. Because these changes were not observed in Cohort 2, it can
be inferred that they are confounded by the influence of time of testing. Whitboume, et
al. also observed gender differences in the 1988 cross-sectional analysis and in the age
20 and age 3 1 time lag analyses. All gender effects favored women. Overall, this line of
research utilizing a cohort-sequential design and a theoretically guided measure provides
consistent evidence for age-related increases in psychosocial resolution.
The present investigation was a 34-year sequential follow-up of Constantinople s
(1969) original investigation and expands on previous work by extending the age range
for which there are overlapping periods of testing. Longitudinal data were available for
(a) the 20-3 1 year old age range for all three cohorts, (b)
the 31-42 year old age range for
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Cohorts 1 and 2, and (c) Cohort Ifrom 42-54 years of age. Members of Cohort 1 who
originally participated as undergraduates in the 1960s were tested on four separate
occasions, 1966, 1977, 1988, and 2000, and were approximately 54 years old in the 2000
testing. Members of Cohort 2 who participated as undergraduates in the 1970s were
tested on three separate occasions, 1977, 1988, and 2000, and were approximately 42
years old in the 2000 testing. Members of Cohort 3 who were first tested in the 1988
follow-up were approximately 31 in the 2000 follow-up.
The Psychosocial Maturity Hypothesis; Additional Support
Using a cohort-sequential design and a theoretically derived measure of
Erikson’s eight-stage theory, Whitboume and her colleagues have provided strong
empirical support for age-related ontogenetic personality development in adulthood.
Research investigating the development of other dimensions of personality in adulthood,
such as emotion regulation, defense mechanisms, and coping, provides additional
support for the psychosocial maturity hypothesis.
According to Erikson’s principle of epigenesis, successful resolution of earlier
crises sets the stage for successful resolution of later crises. Nowhere is the relationship
more closely linked then between identity resolution and generativity. Presumably, those
who have successfully achieved an integrated identity in young adulthood will be more
able to care for the next generation at midlife when generative strivings become most
salient. Consistent with this postulate, identity development in young adulthood has been
found to predict midlife generativity, which in turn predicts life satisfaction and self-
esteem in a longitudinal study of college educated women (de Haan & MacDermid,
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1995). Similarly, generativity correlates highly with well-being in individuals with
articulated ego structures, which is indicative of ego identity crisis resolution (de St.
Aubin & McAdams, 1995).
Vandewater, Ostrove, and Stewart (1997) have also studied the extent to which
identity resolution in early adulthood predicts increased generativity and well-being in
middle adulthood. Consistent with Erikson’s theory, an integrated sense of self (identity
development) and generative capacity were considered integral components of well-
being; social role involvement was considered to express, as well as facilitate, identity
achievement and midlife generativity in these samples. As predicted, engaging in
multiple roles at the age of 28 was predictive of increased identity resolution in midlife
(age 43 and 47 in the two samples). In addition, identity achievement predicted midlife
generativity in the late forties, which significantly predicted psychological well-being in
both samples. This explicit support of Erikson’s principle of epigenesis is significant
because, while the Radcliffe longitudinal sample is homogeneous with respect to
socioeconomic status, the Michigan longitudinal sample is relatively diverse. Thus,
identity is related to well-being, and generativity resolution is dependent on earlier
identity development, findings which clearly support the psychosocial maturity
hypothesis.
According to Vaillant (1977), the ability to cope and defend against emotionally
sensitive and psychologically threatening information is a hallmark of psychological
maturity. Vaillant proposed a hierarchical model of defense mechanisms in which
immature defenses such as denial predominate in early life and more mature
mechanisms, such as humor and altruism, come to the fore in later life. Similarly, Haan
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(1977) proposed that the use of coping strategies that involve cognitive mediation and
mature emotional expression increase with age whereas defensive processes that lack
conscious cognitive mediation and distort reality decrease with age. Both the Vaillant
and Haan models have received considerable empirical support in investigations of
defense mechanisms in later adulthood. For example, it has been found that older adults
score lower on immature coping and defensive strategies and higher on more mature
strategies than younger adults (Diehl, Coyle, & Labouvie-Vief, 1996). Clearly, older
adults have the ability to handle negative emotions in a more productive and positive
manner than do their younger counterparts. This ability allows them to engage in
extensive "damage control" when exposed to potentially negative emotional
interchanges in which they are made to feel weak, inferior, or rejected.
Negative affect (NA) is defined as the dispositional tendency to experience
negative or aversive emotional states including fear, anxiety, hostility, scorn, and anger
(Watson & Clark, 1984). The absence of these aversive emotional states is what is meant
by the term well-being, which Erikson intimately linked with the development of
personality in adulthood. Consistent with this view, several studies have documented
decreases in NA over the life span and corresponding increases in the experience of
positive affect (Helson & Klohnen, 1998; Jones & Meredith, 2000; Mroczek & Kolarz,
1998). Most recently, Jones and Meredith (2000) assessed interindividual differences in
intraindividual change in 236 men and women from three distinct longitudinal samples.
Using a clinician-rated index of psychological health, life span trajectories of
subsamples of individuals at 14, 18, 30, 40, 50, and 62 years of age were modeled using
latent curve analysis. The PHI was constructed by having experienced clinicians
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generate Q-sort profiles of the ‘ideally psychologically healthy’ individual Surprisingly,
adolescent trajectories of psychological health remained constant between the ages of 14
and 18. More importantly, psychological health steadily increased across the years from
30 to 62 years of age.
Levels of affectivity and defensive profiles have been shown to undergo
developmental changes across the life cycle. Presumably, it is the ego that is responsible
for these changes, because it is the function of the ego to adapt flexibly and
resourcefully to internal and external psychological pressures (Klohnen, 1996). Because
life span developmental changes in emotionality and defenses have been documented
empirically, it should be expected that the organizer and interpreter of life’s experiences
change as well. Loevinger (1976) formulated a model of ego development in which
individuals move from less mature levels of functioning (e g., impulsive, self-protective,
ritual-traditional, and conformist) to more mature levels of functioning (e.g., self-aware,
conscientious, individualistic, autonomous, and integrated) with increasing age.
According to her model, increasing ego development is associated with greater (a)
respect for individual autonomy, (a) appreciation of the give and take of interpersonal
relationships, (c) internalization of rules governing social relationship, (d) cognitive
complexity, and (e) impulse control.
Helson and Roberts (1994) examined the relationship between ego development
and California Personality Inventory (CPI) profiles both retrospectively and
prospectively in a longitudinal sample ofwomen (N = 90). Participants at the age of 43
were classified into three ego levels (i.e., self-aware and below, conscientious, and
individualistic and above) and their profiles were compared with CPI profiles gathered
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at the ages of 21, 43, and 52. Ego development was evident across the specified time
periods in ways consistent with Loevinger’s theory. Women who were medium to high
in ego level (e.g., either conscientious or individualistic and beyond) at the age of 43,
increased in predictable ways on the tolerance, achievement via independence, and
psychological mindedness dimensions of the CPI, Thus, the ego shows developmental
change in adulthood that is consistent with the psychosocial maturity hypothesis.
McAdams (1994) maintained that trait personality research is less likely to detect
personality change than qualitative research because traits are abstractions from real
world living; that is, they are not contingent on life experiences. Thus, research
investigating the influences of sociocultural conditions on personality development
should also support the psychosocial maturity hypothesis. Helson, Stewart, and Ostrove
(1995) examined the development of ego identity, the dimension of personality that
describes the individual’s relationship to society, across different sociohistorical periods
in three distinct longitudinal samples of midlife women who were young adults in the
50s, early 60s, and late 60s. The authors conceptualized the Achievement-Diffuse
identity status dimension as a continuum ranging from integrated to unintegrated, and
the Moratorium-Foreclosure identity status dimension as a continuum ranging from
search to acceptance. Identity patterns clearly showed differential relations to work and
family across cohorts, which is indicative of sociocultural influence. Specifically,
identity acceptors were more likely to be in stable marriages and have children at midlife
and identity searchers were more likely to be divorced, or never married, and have
higher status occupations. Furthermore, Helson and her colleagues observed that
integrated acceptors (i.e., the carriers of the tradition) were more alike across samples
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than integrated searchers (i.e., the carriers of change) indicating that the changing social
climate allowed identity searchers the opportunity to explore. Thus, changing social
context affects personality development.
The Present Study
The present study focused on four interrelated issues. First, the present analysis
was interested in whether or not personality changes or remains stable in adulthood. To
assess stability and change in adulthood, mean-level and rank-order consistency
coefficients were used. Mean-level stability assesses the degree to which groups of
individuals’ scores increase or decrease over time. If adult personality remains stable,
than stability rather than change should be reflected in mean stage scores on the IPD
over time. However, if personality changes in adulthood, then mean scores should
change from one testing to the next. Rank-order consistency refers to the degree
individuals in a group maintain their rank ordering of scores over time. If personality
remains stable in adulthood, then the median stability coefficient for a given time
interval should vary around a magnitude of .65 (Costa & McCrae, 1994). If personality
changes over time, then test-retest correlations for a given time interval should be
substantially lower. It was expected that both mean-level and rank-order indices would
reflect personality change in adulthood rather than stability.
Second, this study was interested in assessing the extent to which personality
change, if detected, is consistent with Erikson’s theory and indicative of psychosocial
maturity. According to Erikson’s theory. Stages 5, 6, and 7 are most salient in adulthood.
The resolution of the identity versus identity diffusion crisis marks the beginning of
adulthood, concerns associated with intimacy and isolation ascend in the 30s, and
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themes associated with generativity versus stagnation come to the fore in the 40s and
50s. However, personality development is not as neat as stage models depict. Although
more significant change was expected in later as opposed to earlier stages, change in
earlier stages was not unexpected. In particular, it was expected that Cohort 3 would
show significant change on early crisis stages as Cohorts 1 and 2 had during the age
range. Cross-sectional ly, it was expected that Cohort 1 would score higher than Cohort 2
or 3 would, and Cohort 2 would score higher than Cohort 3 would on the individual IPD
stages. Because Erikson placed the generativity crisis squarely in middle adulthood, it
was also expected that Cohort I’s generativity scores at age 54 (2000) would be
significantly higher than its generativity scores at age 42 (1988).
Third, this study focused on determining the extent to which personality change
is age-related or the result of environmental influence or sociohistorical circumstance.
Using a cross-sequential design on all cohorts’ IPD scores from 1988 and 2000, we
explored the possibility that different cohorts responded differently to the sociocultural
events of the 1990s. Whitboume, et al (1992) observed a “precipitous decline” (p. 269)
on Stage 8 (ego integrity versus despair) scores from 1977 to 1988 in Cohorts 1 and 2
and surmised that this trend reflected general erosion of philosophical values in
conjunction with the rise in materialism during the 1980s. Given the possibility that
these declines reflected environmental influences, it was expected that ego integrity
scores would increase in Cohort’s 1 and 2 because of the economic growth enjoyed by
these cohorts during this time period.
Using cohort-sequential designs, this study also assessed the extent to which
changes on the IPD over time reflect true maturation or the impact of environmental
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influence. If the same general pattern of change or stability is rellected in the means of
two or more cohorts tested over non-overlapping time periods, it can be more
confidently concluded that the change observed is the result aging rather than
environmental influence. However, if different patterns emerge between cohorts, then
socio-historical influence is suspected. It was expected that Cohort 3 would show
increases from 1988 (20 years old) to 2000 (32 years old) on Stages 4, 5, and 6 that are
similar to the increases observed on these stages for Cohorts 1 and 2 over the same age
range. It was also expected that the increases observed for Cohort 1 between the ages of
3 1 and 42 on Stage 2 (autonomy vs. shame and doubt) and Stage 3 (initiative vs. guilt)
would not be replicated in Cohort 2 over the same age range suggesting the influence of
environmental influence.
Fourth, this investigation investigated whether psychosocial development is
different for men and women. As opposed to longitudinal studies conducted exclusively
on women (Helson & Roberts, 1994; Helson et al., 1995; Vandewater et al., 1997), the
present study consisted of three cohorts of men and women tested over non-overlapping
time periods making it possible to examine gender differences in psychosocial
development. Although gender differences have been documented in both follow-up
studies using the IPD (Whitbourne & Waterman, 1979; Whitboume et al., 1992), as well
as Constantinople’s (1969) original investigation, these differences have not been large.
As a result, it was predicted that the few gender effects observed would show women






The effects of age, cohort, and time of testing are confounded in conventional
analyses of developmental processes. In traditional longitudinal designs, age is varied
while cohort is held constant leaving confounded the influence of time of testing. In
conventional cross-sectional designs, age and cohort are varied leaving these two
components inextricably confounded. In the time lag design, cohort is varied while age
is held constant, which does not account for the effect of cohort and time of
measurement. As a result, the present study uses hyphenated terminology to indicate
confounds associated with the independent variables of these analyses. Age-time refers
to the time of measurement confound associated with determining age-related change in
longitudinal analyses. Age-cohort refers to the cohort confound associated with
determining cross-sectional differences. Time-age refers to the confound of time of
testing and age in the cross-sequential Cohort-time refers to both cohort and time of
testing confounds associated with time lag comparisons, which aim to determine
whether differences exist between cohorts at a given age.
In addition to using conventional designs to examine age, cohort, and time of testing
effects, the design of the present study (see Figure 2; Appendix B) uses two components
of Schaie’s (1965) “most efficient design” (p. 107); the cross-sequential and cohort-
sequential. The cohort-sequential and cross-sequential designs provide greater validity
than single-time of testing or within cohort tests because they allow for replication
15
across time and cohort. That is, if similar age differences in a cohort-sequential analysis
are observed for two or more cohorts then it can be more confidently concluded that
these age differences reflect true age effects. Similarly, if cohort differences are
observed at two or more time of testing than it can be more confidently concluded that
the measure of choice is sensitive to environmental differences particular to time of birth
(Whitboume, 2001).
The cross-sequential design contrasts cohort effects against time of
measurement effects and the cohort-sequential design contrasts cohort effects against
age effects. The two main effects in the cross-sequential analysis are cohort-time and
time of measurement-age. The two main effects in the cohort-sequential analyses are
age-time and cohort-time. Significant interactions in the cross-sequential and cohort-
sequential permits the relative separation of age, cohort, and time of testing effects.
Table 1 (Appendix A) summarizes the multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA)
comparisons of age, cohort, and time of testing. In all MANOVA tests, gender was
included as an independent variable. The IPD was the dependent variable in all analyses.
Only Stages 1-6 are used in analyses involving Cohort I’s college scores as Stages 7 and
8 were added beginning with the 1977 follow-up.
Participants
Figure 2 presents the overall design of the present study with total sample sizes
for each cohort at each time of testing. University of Rochester Alumni are classified
into three cohorts based on year of original testing (i.e., 1966-68, 1977-78, or
1988-89).
To ease the presentation of results from the present study, time of testing has been
rounded off to 1966, 1977, 1988, and 2000. Data collection, however, may have
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preceded or extended slightly beyond a given year of testing. Age was rounded off to 20,
31, 42, and 54, although the mean age for each cohort varied slightly around the chosen
age values. Cohort 1 respondents ranged in age from 52 to 56 (M = 54.25, SD = 1 07),
Cohort 2 respondents ranged in age from 41 to 46 (M= 43.38,^ = 1 .3 1), Cohort 3
respondents ranged in age from 29 to 42 (M = 3 1 .93,^ = 2.09). The greater standard
deviation for Cohort 2 as compared to Cohorts 1 and 3 was due to two respondents, age
38 and 42, respectively.
Cohort 1 originally consisted of 347 participants, 180 men (51.8%) and 166
women 947.8%). In 1977, 155 participants, 79 men (50.9%) and 77 women (49.6%),
completed testing representing 52% of the original sample. In 1988, 99 participants were
successfully followed, 62 men (62.6%) and 37 women (37.3%). All 99 participants from
the 1988 follow-up had participated in the 1977 follow-up. In the 2000 follow-up, 105
completed testing, 59 men (65.2%) and 46 women (43.8%). Of these 105 follow-up
participants, 53 (50.4%) completed all four IPD testings (1966, 1977, 1988, & 2000), 14
(13.3%) completed the 1977 and 2000 testings but not the 1988 follow-up, and 38
(36.2%) missed the 1977 and 1988 follow-ups but participated in the 2000 testing.
Cohort 2 originally consisted of 298 participants. However, because the
University of Rochester changed its record keeping system during the interval between
1977 and 1988, many participants were not located in thel988 testing. As a result, only
83 (27%) were successfully followed, 42 men (50.6%) and 40 women (48.2%). In the
2000 testing, 73 participants, 27 men (36.9%) and 46 women (63%), were successfully
followed representing 24.4% of the original sample. Of these 73 participants, 30
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completed both the 1988 and 2000 follow-ups, and 43 missed the 1988 follow-up but
participated in the 2000 testing.
Cohort 3 was first tested in 1988 and consisted of 292 undergraduate
participants, 181 men (61.9%) and 1 1 1 women (38%). In the 2000 follow-up, 55
participants completed the testing representing 18.8% of the original college sample Of
these 55 participants, 34 were men (61.8%) and 21 were women (38.1%).
Attrition effects were examined for all three cohorts using two-way gender x
attrition status MANOVAs with IPD stage scores as the dependent variable. Cohort 1
participants in the 2000 follow-up were classified into one of six attrition groups. These
groups were comprised of individuals who participated in a) all four testings, b) 1977
and 2000, c) 1977 and 1988, d) 2000 only, e) 1977 only, and f) none of the follow-up
testings. No multivariate main effects for attrition status or interactions between attrition
status and gender were observed on Cohort I’s college scores, 1977 scores, or 1988
scores. Cohort 2 participants in the 2000 follow-up were classified into one of four
attrition groups. These Cohort 2 attrition groups were comprised of individuals who
participated in a) all three testings, b) 2000 but not 1988, c) 1988 but not 2000, and d)
neither 1988 nor 2000. No multivariate main effects for attrition status or interactions
between attrition status and gender were observed on Cohort 2’s college scores (1977) or
1988 follow-up scores. Cohort 3 participants in the 2000 testing were classified into two
groups: Participants who completed the follow-up testing and participants who did not.
Based on these groupings, no multivariate main effects for attrition status or interactions
between attrition status and gender were observed on Cohort 3 s college scores (1988).
As a result, attrition does not appear to be a significant factor in the current study.
18
Measure
Inventory of Psychosocial Development (Constantinople. 1969: Whitboume et
^ The 80-item Inventory of Psychosocial Development (IPD) is a measure of
Erikson s (1963) eight-stage theory of psychosocial development. Constantinople (1969)
developed the first six subscales in cross-sectional and longitudinal studies of University
of Rochester students in the mid 1960s; Stages 7 and 8 were developed in subsequent
research and described in Walaskay, Whitboume, and Nehrke (1983-1984). The IPD
yields eight stage scores with 5 positive items and 5 negative items contributing to each
score. Respondents are asked to indicate how characteristic or uncharacteristic a given
item is of them on a 7-point Likert-type scale. For example, a representative basic tmst
item is, “Deep unshakeable faith in myself’ and a representative basic mistmst item is,
“Pessimistic, little hope,” and respondents are asked to rate how characteristic or
uncharacteristic these items are of them. Difference sores are obtained for each stage
score by subtracting the summed score of the negative items from the summed scores of
the positive items. For each stage, the range of possible scores is from -30 to +30.
Reliability coefficients for the IPD for Cohort 1 in the 2000 testing were: Stage
1, .82, Stage 2, .44, Stage 3, .73, Stage 4, .82, Stage 5, .72, Stage 6, .74, Stage 7, .52, and
Stage 8, .78. Internal consistency estimates for the IPD for Cohort 2 in the 2000 testing
were: Stage 1, .76, Stage 2, .25, Stage 3, .71, Stage 4, .81, Stage 5, .71, Stage 6, .72,
Stage 7, .37, and Stage 8, .75. Reliability estimates for the eight IPD stages for Cohort 3
in the 2000 testing were: Stage 1, .74, Stage 2, .40, Stage 3, .69, Stage 4, .79, Stage 5,
.52, Stage 6, .62, Stage 7, .49, and Stage 8, .71. As can be seen from these data.
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Cronbach’s alpha was lowest for Stages 2 and 7 for all cohorts, which is consistent with
past research (Walaskay et al., 1983-1984, Waterman & Whitbourne, 1981).
Procedure
In the summer of 2000, a questionnaire packet containing informed consent, a
demographics page, the IPD, a debriefing form, and several other short measures not
reported in this study was compiled. After an initial preparatory phase in which
addresses were compiled for all study participants (see below), questionnaire packets
were sent to each address obtained. Cover letters were included that reminded
participants of the importance of their responses and their previous participation in
earlier studies. This letter was not personally signed but mass reproduced.
Questionnaires were folded and mailed in University of Massachusetts Department of
Psychology business envelopes with computer printed address labels affixed to both the
envelope and the questionnaire for identification purposes. A business reply return
envelope was included for the convenience of the respondents. Approximately one
month after the initial questionnaire was mailed, a follow-up questionnaire was mailed
to nonrespondents urging them to complete and return their packets.
Cohort I’s address information from the 1988 follow-up was updated to its most
current status using the University of Rochester alumni directory. Of the 347 Cohort 1
participants, 264 were listed in the directory and 82 were not. For participants who were
not listed in the directory, questionnaire packets were sent to addresses based on 1988
follow-up information. Of the 264 participants for whom we had most recent address
information, 101 returned questionnaires representing 96% of Cohort 1 respondents. Of
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information, 101 returned questionnaires representing 96% of Cohort 1 respondents Of
the 82 participants for whom we did not have updated address information, 4 returned
questionnaires (3.8%).
Between the 1977 testing and 1988 follow-up, the University of Rochester
changed its record keeping system, which resulted in a loss of 215 Cohort 2 participants
in the 1988 follow-up. In the 2000 follow-up, address information was updated for 193
Cohort 2 participants using the University of Rochester alumni directory. Of these 193
participants, 56 returned questionnaires representing 76.7% of Cohort 2 respondents. To
improve return rate for Cohort 2 participants, an internet service was used to locate study
participants by social security number. Current addresses for 70 Cohort 2 participants
were obtained using this method. Of these 70 participants, 14 returned questionnaires,
which represents 19.2% of Cohort 2 respondents overall. Neither current nor 1988
address information was available for 24 people in Cohort 2. Because a variety of
sources were available to obtain updated address information in the 2000 testing,
completed questionnaires were received from 43 Cohort 2 participants who had been
lost in the 1988 follow-up.
For Cohort 3, current address information was obtained through the University of
Rochester alumni directory for 187 participants. Current addresses for 74 Cohort 3
participants were also obtained using social security number. Current address
information and 1988 college address information was not available for 31 Cohort 3
participants. Of the 188 Cohort participants for whom we obtained current address
information from the University of Rochester alumni directory, 15 returned
questionnaires, which represents 28.8% of all Cohort 3 respondents. Of the 75
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participants for whom we obtained current address information by social security
number, 19 returned questionnaires, which represents 36.5% of all Cohort 3 respondents
Current e-mail information for 63 Cohorts 3 participants was also obtained using the
University of Rochester’s on-line student and alumni directory. These were individuals
who did not return questionnaires based on the address information we obtained through
the University of Rochester directory or the internet service using social security
numbers. Based on this search, 21 participants returned questionnaires after they had
been solicited by e-mail representing 36.4% of Cohort 3 2000 testing respondents. One





Findings from the present study will be presented in two main sections. In the
first section are results from the multivariate analyses. In the second section, univariate
inferential statistics for each significant multivariate effect are presented by stage. The
independent variables (IV) in the multivariate and univariate analyses are (a) age-time,
(b) age-cohort, (c) cohort-time, (d) time-age, and (e) gender. The dependent variable is
the IPD in all analyses. Multivariate and univariate main effects and interactions are
reported if they were significant at p < .05.
Erikson’s (1963) eight-stages of psychosocial development are referred to by
stage number in order to facilitate the presentation of the results. The stages and the
psychosocial crises they represent are summarized as follows; Stage 1 ; trust versus
mistrust; Stage 2; autonomy versus shame and doubt; Stage 3; initiative versus guilt;
Stage 4: industry versus inferiority; Stage 5; identity versus identity diffusion; Stage 6:
intimacy versus isolation; Stage 7; generativity versus stagnation; and Stage 8; ego
integrity versus despair. The means and standard deviations for all IPD stages, pooled
for all respondents, by cohort and time of testing are shown in Table 2 (Appendix A).
Stability coefficients for the IPD for all cohorts across all possible time intervals are
represented in Table 3 (Appendix A). It is apparent upon examination of this table that
stability coefficients are highest for Cohort 1 between the ages of 42 (1988) and 54
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(2000) and next highest for Cohort 2 between the ages of 3
1 (1988) and 42 (2000) U
also apparent that 10-year test-retest intervals yield greater stability coefficients than
longer test-retest intervals.
Multivariate Analyses of Variance (MANOVAs)
Table 4 (Appendix A) summarizes the significant MANOVA main effects and
interactions. To examine the longitudinal stability of IPD stage scores for Cohort 1 from
20 to 54 years of age, a 2 (gender) x 4 (age-time) MANOVA was performed with
repeated measures on the second factor and IPD Stages 1-6 as the dependent variable.
This analysis revealed a significant multivariate main effect of age-time, Wilks’s lambda
=
.480, F (18, 428) = 7.05, p < .0001. To examine Cohort I’s pattern of scores on all
eight stages, a 2 (gender) x 3 (age-time) MANOVA was performed with repeated
measures on the second factor and IPD Stages 1-8 as the dependent variable. This
analysis also revealed a significant multivariate main effect of age-time, Wilks’s lambda
=
.539, F (16, 194) = 4.39, p < .0001. These significant multivariate main effects of age-
time indicate that the pattern of stage scores for Cohort 1 varied across the ages tested.
To determine longitudinal differences on the IPD for Cohort 2, a 2 (gender) x 3 (age-
time) MANOVA was performed with repeated measures on the second factor and IPD
stages 1-8 as the dependent variable. This analysis revealed a significant main effect for
age-time, Wilks’s lambda = .417, F (16, 98) = 3.36, p < .0001, indicating that the pattern
of EPD stage scores for Cohort 2 is different at different ages. Lastly, a 2 (gender) x 2
(age-time) MANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor and IPD stage scores
as the dependent variable was performed to assess longitudinal differences on the EPD
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for Cohort 3 from 1988 to 2000. This analysis also revealed a significant main effect for
age-time, Wilks’s lambda =
.633, F (8, 46) = 3.34, p < .004. As with Cohorts 1 and 2,
this finding indicates that IPD stage scores varied with age.
To determine cross-sectional differences on the IPD among Cohorts 1, 2, and 3
for the 2000 testing, a 2 (gender) x 3 (age-cohort) MANOVA was performed, which
revealed a significant main effect for age-cohort, Wilks’s lambda = .826, F (16, 442) =
2.77, p < .0001. This main effect of age-cohort indicates that Cohorts 1, 2, and 3 differ
in the resolution ofIPD stages 1-8 in the 2000 testing. To assess the impact of
environmental influence at a given age, two separate time lag analyses were performed.
A 2 (gender) x 3 (cohort-time) MANOVA was performed to examine differences
between Cohorts 1, 2, and 3 when the average age of each cohort was approximately 3
1
years old. This analysis revealed a significant main effect for gender, Wilks’s lambda =
.924, F (8, 280) = 2.875, p < .004, indicating that the pattern ofIPD stage scores is
different for 3 1 year old men and women across cohort. This analysis also revealed a
significant cohort-time main effect, Wilks’s lambda = .788, F (16, 560) = 4.426, p <
.0001, indicating that the pattern of EPD stage scores is different between cohorts when
they were each tested at 31 years of age. A 2 (gender) x 2 (cohort-time) MANOVA was
also performed to examine differences between Cohorts 1 and 2 when their average age
was 42. This time lag analysis for the age of 42 revealed a significant main effect for
cohort-time, Wilks’s lambda = .894, F (8, 160) = 2.368, p < .020, indicating that the
pattern of IPD stage scores differs between Cohorts 1 and 2 when they were each tested
at 42 years of age.
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A 2 (gender) x 3 (cohort-time) x 2 (time of measurement-age) cross-sequential
MANOVA was performed with repeated measures on the third factor to assess the
relative effects of cohort and time of testing on 1988 and 2000 IPD stage scores. This
analysis revealed main effects for cohort-time, Wilks’s lambda =
.668, F (16, 256) =
3.572, p < .0001, and time-age, Wilks’s lambda = .823, F (8, 128) = 3.449, p < .001
.
However, these main effects were qualified by a significant cohort-time x time of
measurement-age interaction, Wilks’s lambda = .796, F (16, 256) = 1.933, p < .018,
indicating that IPD stage scores changed differently for Cohorts 1, 2, and 3 between
1988 and 2000.
To examine the relationship between environmental influence and age-related
change on IPD stage scores, four cohort-sequential analyses were conducted. Because
data are available for all cohorts between the ages of 20 and 3 1, a 2 (gender) x 3 (cohort-
time) X 2 (age-time) MANOVA was performed with repeated measures on the third
factor. Because this analysis involves Cohort 1 scores from 1966, only IPD stages 1-6
are used. This analysis revealed main effects for gender, Wilks’s lambda = .945, F (6,
283) = 2.753, p < .013, cohort-time, Wilks’s lambda = .917, F (12, 566) = 2.077, p <
.017, and age-time, Wilks’s lambda = .671, F (6, 283) = 23.171, p < .0001. These results
first indicate that the pattern of IPD stage scores is different for men and women
averaging over cohort and age. They further show that IPD patterns differ for the cohorts
and at that there is significant change in some IPD stage scores from time 1 (20 years
old) to time 2 (3 1 years old). IPD scores for Stages 1-8 are only available
for Cohorts 2
and 3 between the ages of 20 and 3 1 as Stages 7 and 8 were not included in the original
1966 study. Thus, to examine differences between Cohorts 2 and 3 between the ages
20
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and 3 1 for all 8 IPD stages, a 2 (gender) x 2 (cohort-time) x 2 (age-time) MANOVA
was performed with repeated measures on the third factor. This analysis revealed a
significant main effect for gender, Wilks’s lambda =
.886, F (8, 127) = 2. 039, p < .047,
and age-time, Wilks’s lambda =
.616, F (8, 127) = 9.907, p < .0001, which indicates that
the pattern of IPD stage scores is different for men and women averaging over cohort
and age, and that there is significant change in some stages between the ages 20 to 3 1.
A 2 (sex) X 2 (cohort-time) x 3 (age-time) MANOVA was performed with
repeated measures on the third factor to evaluate environmental influence versus age
related change between the ages 20 and 42 on the IPD for Cohorts 1 and 2. This analysis
revealed significant main effects for cohort-time, Wilks’s lambda = .887, F (6, 120) =
2.544, p < .024, and age-time, Wilks’s lambda = .664, F (12, 490) = 9.280, p < .0001
.
However, these main effects were qualified by a significant age-time x cohort-time
interaction, Wilks’s lambda = .908, F (12, 490) = 2.014, p < .021, indicating the pattern
of results for IPD Stages 1-8 between the ages 20 and 42 differs between Cohort 1 and 2.
Because analyses involving Cohort 1 college scores exclude Stages 7 and 8, a 2 (sex) x 2
(cohort-time) x 2 (age-time) MANOVA was performed with repeated measures on the
third factor for Cohorts 1 and 2 between the ages 3 1 and 42. As in the previous cohort-
sequential analysis, this MANOVA revealed significant main effects for cohort-time,
Wilks’s lambda = .750, F (8, 1 18) = 4.906, p < .0001, and age-time, Wilks’s lambda
=
.763, F (8, 118) = 4.579, p < .0001, that were qualified by a significant
age-time x
cohort-time interaction, Wilks’s lambda = .848, F (8, 118) = 2.652, p < .01. This
interaction indicates that the pattern of results for IPD Stages 1-8 between
the ages 31
and 42 differs between Cohort 1 and 2.
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Univariate Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs)
The univariate inferential statistics for each multivariate main effect and
interaction are displayed in Table 5 (Appendix A). Significant effects will be
summarized by stage in the following way: (a) age-time effects based on the longitudinal
analyses; (b) age-cohort effects based on the 2000 cross-sectional analysis; (c) cohort-
time effects based on time lag analyses, (d) cohort-time x time-age interaction effects
based on the 1988-2000 cross-sequential analysis, and (e) age-time x cohort-time
interaction effects based on the cohort-sequential analyses.
Figures 3-8 display the means for the Cohort 1 longitudinal analysis of Stages 1-
6 from age 20 to 54; Figures 9 and 10 show the means for the Cohort 1 longitudinal
analysis of Stages 7 and 8 from age 3 1 to 54. Figures 11-18 display the means for the
cross-sequential analysis of IPD stage scores for Cohorts 1, 2, and 3 for the 1988 and
2000 testings. Figures 19-24 show the means for the cohort-sequential analysis of Stages
1-6 from age 20 to 31 for all cohorts; Figures 25 and 26 display the means for the
cohort-sequential analysis of Stages 7 and 8 from age 20 to 31 for Cohorts 2 and 3.
Figures 27-32 show the means for the cohort-sequential analysis of Stages 1-6 from age
20 to 42 for Cohorts 1 and 2, and Figures 33 and 34 display the means for the cohort-
sequential analysis of Stages 7 and 8 from age 31 to 42 for Cohorts 1 and 2. All figures
are displayed in Appendix B.
Multivariate main effects for gender were observed in the time lag analysis of all
cohorts at 3 1 years of age and the two cohort-sequential analyses involving
the ages 20
to 3 1 . These significant multivariate effects were due to univariate main effects for
gender in the time lag analysis of all cohorts tested at 31 years of age on Stage 4, F (1,
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287) = 4.783, p < .03, Stage 6, F (1, 287) = 9.41 1, p < .002, and Stage 7, F (1, 287) =
6.341, p < .012. Gender effects were also observed in the two cohort- sequential
analyses. Main effects of gender were observed on Stage 4, F (1, 288) = 4.71, p < .03 1,
and Stage 6 F (1, 288) = 5.37, p < .021, in the cohort-sequential analysis of Cohorts 1, 2,
and 3 tested at ages 20 and 31, and gender main effects were observed on Stage 4, F (1,
134) = 7.246, p < .008, Stage 6, F (1, 134) = 8.356, p < .004, and Stage 7, F (1, 134) =
5. 192, p < .024, in the cohort-sequential analysis of Cohort 2 and 3 tested at ages 20 and
3 1. As predicted on the basis of prior research, all gender effects favored women.
Stage 1
Age-time effects. A significant univariate effect for age-time was observed in the
Cohort 1 longitudinal analysis for IPD scores from 1966 to 2000, F (3, 159) = 3.356, p <
.02. Planned comparisons of this stage over the four times of testing revealed that age 20
scores (M = 1 1.20) were not significantly different from age 3 1 scores (M = 1 1 06) but
that age 42 scores (M = 13.56) were significantly higher than age 20 (p < .019) and age
31 (p < .009) scores. Scores at age 54 (M=13.65) were also higher than scores at ages 20
(p < .05) and 3 1 (p < .04) but were not significantly different from age 42 scores. This
univariate effect was also present in the Cohort 1 longitudinal analysis involving all
eight IPD stages from ages 31 to 54. A significant univariate effect for age-time was also
observed in the Cohort 3 longitudinal analysis from age 20 to age 31, F (1, 54) = 5.447,
p < .023. Age 3 1 scores in the year 2000 (M = 12.09) were significantly greater than age
20 scores in the 1988 (M = 10.05). A significant main effect for age-time was also
observed in the cohort-sequential analysis involving Cohorts 1, 2, and 3 at ages 20 and




Age-time effects. Cohort 1 ’s scores on this stage were different across the four
times of testing as revealed by the significant univariate effect of age-time in the
longitudinal analysis from age 20 (1966) to age 54 (2000), F (3, 1 59) = 3.077, p < 029.
Planned comparisons revealed that Stage 2 scores did not change significantly from age
20 (M = 9.00) to age 3 1 scores (M = 7.61) or from ages 42 to 54 (M = 9.926). There was
a marginally significant difference between ages 3 1 to 42 (M = 9.3 1 5), p < .055. Cohort
1 scores at age 54 remained significantly higher than age 31 scores, p < .01. This
univariate effect of age-time was also present in the longitudinal analysis involving all
eight IPD stages from age 3 1 (1977) to age 54 (2000).
Age-cohort effects. A univariate main effect for age-cohort was observed for
Stage 2 in the cross-sectional analysis of Cohorts 1, 2, and 3 for the year 2000, F (2,
231) = 5.373, p < .005. A priori contrasts on the cells involved in this analysis supported
predictions based on theory. Cohort I’s 2000 scores on Stage 2 (M = 9.47) were greater
than Cohort 2’s 2000 scores on Stage 2 (M=7.43), t (231) = 2.596, p < .01. Cohort 1 s
scores in 2000 were also higher than cohort 3’s scores in 2000 (M= V. 14), t (23 1) =
2.718, p<.007.
Cohort-time effects . A significant univariate effect for cohort-time was observed
on Stage 2 in the cross-sequential analysis comparing BPD stage scores for
Cohorts 1, 2,
and 3 from 1988 to 2000, F (2, 136) = 5.937, p < .003. Planned comparisons
showed that
across time of testing. Cohort 1 (M = 9.62) had higher Stage 2 scores than Cohort 2 (M
= 6.63), p < .006, and higher Stage 2 scores than
Cohort 3 (M = 6 927), p < .003 A
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marginally significant cohort-time effect was also observed for Cohorts 1 and 2 in the
age 42 time lag comparison, F (1, 169) = 3 .644, p < .058. A closer examination of the
cells involved in this analysis revealed that Cohort 1 ’s Stage 2 scores (M = 8.94) in 1988
at the age of 42 were greater than Cohort 2’s Stage 2 scores (M = 7.43) in the year 2000
at the age of 42, t (169) = 2.056, p < .041
.
Stage 3
Age-time effects. A univariate effect for age-time emerged for Stage 3 in the
longitudinal analysis of Cohort 1 ages 20 to 54, F (3, 159) = 3.013, p < .032. Planned
comparisons revealed that age 42 scores (M = 13.57) were greater than age 20 scores
(M= 10.59), p < .002, and age 3 1 scores (M=l 1 13), p < .025. Age 20 scores were not
statistically different from age 31 scores on this IPD subscale for Cohort 1. However,
Cohort 1 ’s Stage 3 scores significantly decreased from age 42 to age 54 (M = 1 1
.50), p <
.013. This age-time effect was also present in the Cohort 1 longitudinal analysis from
age 3 1 to age 54 involving all eight IPD stages. Marginally significant age-time effects
also emerged in the two cohort-sequential analyses involving the three cohorts’ IPD
stage scores from college to age 3 1 . In both cases, age 3 1 scores were greater than
college age scores.
Cohort-time x time-age effects. A significant cohort-time x time-age univariate
interaction emerged in the cross-sequential analysis of all cohorts’ IPD stage scores from
1988 to 2000, F (2, 136) = 3.763, p < .026, indicating that Stage 3 scores changed
differently over this time interval for the three cohorts. Planned comparisons of the cells
involved in this analysis show that Cohort I’s scores significantly decreased from 1988
(M= 13.574) to 2000 (M = 1 1 5), t (53) = 67.29,
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P < .0001, whereas Cohorts 2 and 3 did not significantly change over this time period.
Comparisons of the 1988 scores on this stage for the three cohorts revealed marginally
significant differences between Cohort 1 (M = 13.57) and Cohort 2 (M = 10.53), t (136)
= 1.861, p < .065, as well as between Cohort 1 and Cohort 3 (M = 10.98), t (136) =
1.886, p < .061 . There were no differences between the cohorts on Stage 3 in the 2000
testing.
Age-time x cohort-time effects. A significant univariate age-time x cohort-time
interaction emerged in the cohort-sequential analysis of Cohorts 1 and 2 between the
ages of 20 and 42, F (2, 252) = 4.219, p < .016. Planned comparisons on the cells
involved in this analysis revealed that Cohort I’s age 42 scores (M 12.64) were
significantly greater than its age 20 scores (M = 10.60), p < .004, and age 31 scores (M =
10.90), p < .023. In contrast. Cohort 2’s scores on this stage 3 were not significantly
different over this age range.
Stage 4
Age-time effects. All cohorts displayed significant univariate age-time effects on
Stage 4 in their longitudinal analyses. A main effect for age-time emerged in Cohort I’s
longitudinal analysis from age 20 (1966) to age 54 (2000), F (3, 159) = 34.15, p < .0001.
Planned comparisons of these ages revealed that Stage 1 scores increased significantly
from college (M= 7.74) to age 3 1 (M = 14. 17), p < .0001, and again between ages 3
1
and 42 ( M = 17.30), p < .003. Cohort 1 scores, however, did not significantly change
from age 42 to age 54. Cohort 2 showed significant change on Stage 2 in the
longitudinal analysis from age 20 (1977) to age 42 (2000), F (2, 58) = 7.79, p < .001.
Planned comparisons of the cells involved in this analysis revealed that Stage 4 scores
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increased from age 20 (M= 1 1
.57) to age 31 (M = 14.53), p < .016. There was a
marginally significant increase from age 31 to age 42 (M= 16.80), p < .071. Similarly,
Cohort 3’s Stage 4 scores increased significantly from age 20 in 1988 (M = 9.25) to age
31in 2000 (M — 14.87), F (1, 54) = 22.83, p < .0001 . Main effects for age-time on Stage
4 emerged in all cohort-sequential analyses. Averaging over cohort, scores at age 3
1
were greater than scores at age 20, and scores at age 42 were greater than scores at age
31.
Cohort-time effects . A significant univariate effect of cohort-time emerged in the
cohort-sequential analysis of all cohorts ages 20 to 3 1, F (2, 288) = 5.72, p < .004.
Tukey’s HSD method revealed that averaging across the two times of testing Cohort 2
had significantly higher Stage 4 scores than Cohort 1, p < .004.
Cohort-time x time-age effects. In the cross-sequential analysis involving all
cohorts’ LPD scores in 1988 and 2000, main effects of cohort-time and time-age were
observed for Stage 4. These effects, however, were qualified by a significant cohort-time
X time-age interaction, F (2, 136) = 10.65, p < .0001. Planned comparisons on the cells
involved in this analysis reveal a significant increase from 1988 to 2000 on Cohort 3’s
Stage 4 scores, p < .0001. Cohorts 1 and 2 did not change significantly over this time
period. A priori contrast of the 1988 scores showed that Stage 4 scores for Cohort 3 (M
= 9.25) were significantly lower than Cohort 1 (M ~ 17.30), t (136) = 5. 1, p < .0001, and
Cohort 2, t (136) = 2.83, p < .005.
Age-time x cohort-time effects. In the cohort-sequential analysis of Cohorts 1
and 2 between the ages of 20 and 42, a significant age-time x cohort-time interaction
emerged, F (2, 252) = 3.512, p < .03 1, qualifying the significant main effect of age-time
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observed for this stage. This interaction indicates that the change between ages 20 and
42 was different for Cohorts 1 and 2. Further analysis of the means involved in this
finding show that both Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 showed significant increases on Stage 4
from age 20 to age 42. For Cohort 1, scores increased from a mean of 7.02 at age 20 to a
mean of 13.95 at age 3 1, p < .0001, with scores again increasing from age 3 1 to age 42
(— ~ E • Similarly, Cohort 2’s Stage 4 scores increased from college (M =
1 1.56) to 31 years of age (M = 14.53), p < .016, and showed a marginally significant
increase again from age 3 1 to age 42 (M = 16.8), p < .071 . Although the Stage four
scores for Cohort 1 at age 20 were significantly lower than Stage 4 scores for Cohort 2 at
age 20, t (127) = -2.856, p < .005, Stage 4 scores did not differ between the cohorts at
ages 31 and 42.
Stage 5
Age-time effects. A significant univariate effect of age-time was observed for
Cohort 3 on Stage 5, F (1, 54) = 12.79, p < .001, indicating that scores at age 31 (M =
10.40) were significantly higher than scores at age 20 (M= 6.84). Univariate effects for
age-time were also observed in the cohort-sequential analysis of all cohorts at ages 20
and 31, F (1, 288) = 37.95, p < .0001, and the cohort-sequential analysis of Cohorts 2
and 3 at ages 20 and 3 1, F (1, 134) = 24.63, p < .0001. Both analyses revealed that
across cohort age 3 1 scores were greater than age 20 scores. There was also a significant
univariate effect of age-time in cohort-sequential analysis of Cohorts 1 and 2 ages 20 to
42, F (2, 250) = 4.52, p < .012. Averaging over cohort. Stage 5 scores increased
significantly from college to age 31, p < .013, but did not increase again from age 31 to
42.
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Cohort-time x time-age effects. A significant cohort-time x time-age interaction
emerged from the cross-sequential analysis of all cohorts’ 1988 and 2000 IPD stage
scores, F (2, 136) = 4.80, p < .01, which qualified a significant main effect for time-age
on Stage 5 in this analysis. As with the significant age-time effect described in the
previous section, Cohort 3’s Stage 5 scores increased significantly from 1988 to 2000,
whereas Stage 5 scores for Cohorts 1 and 2 did not. Contrasts further revealed that
Cohort 1 s Stage 5 scores in 1988 (M = 10.79) were significantly higher than Cohort 3’s
Stage 5 scores in 1988 (M = 6.83), t (136) = 2.926, p < .004. No differences emerged
among cohorts in the 2000 testing on this stage.
Stage 6
Age-time effects. No significant changes over time were observed in the
longitudinal analyses of cohorts 1, 2, and 3 on this stage. However, main effects of age-
time did emerge in several of the cohort-sequential analyses. In the cohort- sequential
analysis involving all cohorts ages 20 to 31, age 31 scores were significantly higher than
age 20 scores averaging over cohort, F (1, 288) = 22.00,
P < .0001. A similar finding emerged in the cohoitrsequential analysis involving Cohorts
2 and 3 at ages 20 and 31, F (1, 134) = 1 1.99, p < 001. Again, age 31 scores were
significantly greater than college scores. A significant age-time main effect was also
observed in the cohort-sequential analysis involving Cohorts 1 and 2 from age 20 to age
42, F (2, 250) = 8.33, p < .0001. Analyses of the means involved in this test revealed that
both age 3 1 and 42 scores on Stage 6 were significantly greater than college age scores
on Stage 6, ps < .001. The means at age 31 and 42, however, were not significantly
different.
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Cohort-time effects. A significant univariate effect of cohort-time emerged in the
time lag analysis of Cohorts 1 and 2 at age 42, F (1, 169) = 5. 16, p < .024, indicating that
Cohort 2 (M = 16.19) had higher Stage 6 scores than Cohort 1 (M = 13.32) at age 42.
Cohort-time main effects were also found in the cohort-sequential analysis of Cohorts 1
and 2 between the ages of 20 and 42, F (1, 125) = 4.90, p < .029, and in the cohort-
sequential analysis of Cohorts 1 and 2 between the ages of 31 and 42, F (1, 125) = 4.563,
P < .035. As in the age 42 time lag analysis, these cohort-time main effects were due to
Cohort 2 having greater Stage 6 scores than Cohort 1 averaging across time of testing.
Stage 7
Age-time effects. Contrary to expectations, the only significant age-time effect
that emerged with respect to Stage 7 was in the cohort-sequential analysis of Cohorts 2
and 3 between the ages of 20 and 31, F (1, 134) = 6.73, p < .01 1. Averaging over
cohort, age 3 1 scores were significantly higher than college age scores.
Stage 8
Age-time effects. A univariate effect of age-time emerged in the longitudinal
analysis of Cohort 1 from age 3 1 to age 54, F (2, 106) = 7.52, p < .001. Planned
comparisons revealed that after a decrease in Stage 8 scores from age 31 (M=8.76) to
age 42 (M = 5.44), p < .0001, Cohort 1 showed a non-significant increase in Stage 8
scores from age 42 to age 54 (M = 6.61).
Cohort-time effects . In the age 3 1 time lag analysis of all cohorts, a significant
main effect of cohort-time emerged, F (1, 287) = 1 1.37, p < .0001. Cohort 1 at age 31
scored higher than Cohorts 2 at age 3 1, t (290) = 4.70, p < .0001, and Cohort 3 at
age 3 1,
t (290) = 2.61, p < .009. Cohorts 2 and 3 did not differ
significantly. A significant mam
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effect of cohort-time also emerged in the cross-sequential analysis of all cohorts’ IPD
stage scores from 1988 to 2000, F (2, 136) = 3.30, p < .04. Planned comparisons
revealed that Cohort 1 had greater Stage 8 scores than Cohort 2 averaging over the 1988
and 2000 testings, p < .016.
Age-time x cohort-time effects. The cohort-sequential analysis of Cohorts 1 and
2 from ages 31 to 42 showed a significant age-time x cohort-time interaction, F (1, 125)
= 9.516, p < .003, in addition to the cohort-time and age-time main effects observed for
this stage. Planned comparisons revealed that Cohort I’s scores significantly decreased
over this age range from a mean of 8.76 to a mean of 5.44, t (98) = 6.53, p < .0001,
whereas Cohort 2’s stage scores over this age range did not change significantly. As
previously noted, Cohort 1 manifested higher Stage 8 scores at age 3 1 than Cohort 2 at
age 3 1, t (127) = 4.06, p < .0001. There were no appreciable differences at age 42
between Cohorts 1 and 2.
Summary of Significant Effects Across Stages
Age-time effects. Significant age-time effects were observed for all stages except
Stages 6 and 7. Cohort 3 showed significant increases from age 20 to age 31 on Stage 1
and Cohort I’s Stage 1 scores changed significantly from ages 31 to 42. Cohort 1 also
showed significant movement on Stage 2 but, as with Stage 1, this change reflected
earlier rather than later change. These findings are consistent with expectations as people
in midlife should show relative stability on earlier stages. Surprisingly, Cohort 1 showed
a significant decline in Stage 3 scores from age 42 to age 54, which was the
only
significant age-time effect observed for this stage. All cohorts showed significant
age-
time effects on Stage 4. Cohort 3’s scores at age 31 were significantly
higher than their
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college age scores. The age-time effect for Cohorts 1 and 2 on Stage 4 reflected earlier
rather than later progression, which is consistent with theory. As predicted, only Cohort
3 changed significantly on Stage 5 from 1988 to 2000. Stage 8 scores changed for
Cohort 1 only. It was hypothesized that Stage 8 scores would increase between 1988 and
2000, however, although Cohort 1 scores did increase during this interval, this increase
was not significant. The univariate effect of age-time on this stage for Cohort 1 reflected
a significant decrease in Stage 8 scores from age 3 1 to age 42.
Age-cohort effects. It was hypothesized that differences between cohorts would
emerge in the 2000 cross-sectional analysis as greater psychosocial resolution
accompanies age. The only significant age-cohort effect to emerge, however, was for
Stage 2. Nevertheless, as predicted. Cohort I’s 2000 scores were significantly greater
than Cohort 2’s and Cohort 3’s.
Cohort-time effects. Varying patterns of significant cohort-time effects were
observed in the present research for Stages 2, 4, 6, and 8. Consistent with theory, the
cross-sequential analysis showed Cohort 1 to have greater Stage 2 scores than Cohort 2
averaging over the 1988 and 2000 testings. Cohort 1 also had greater Stage 8 scores than
Cohort 2 in the time lag analysis involving all IPD stage scores at age 3 1 . This finding
also emerged in the cross-sequential analysis; averaging overtime of testing. Cohort 1
had higher Stage 8 scores than Cohort 2. Cohort 2, however, was shown to have greater
Stage 4 scores than Cohort 1 averaging over time of testing in the cohort-sequential
analysis ofIPD stage scores between ages 20 and 3 1. In the time lag analysis of IPD
stage scores at age 42, Cohort 2 was also found to have greater Stage 6 scores than
Cohort 1.
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Cohort-time x time-age effects Significant cohort-time x time-age interaction
effects emerged for Stages 3, 4, and 5, in the cross-sequential analysis involving stage
scores for all cohorts in the 1988 and 2000 testings. Contrary to expectations, Cohort 1 ’s
scores on Stage 3 significantly decreased between times of testing whereas Stage 3
scores for Cohorts 2 and 3 did not. Stage 4 scores significantly changed from 1988 to
2000 for Cohort 3, whereas Stage 4 scores remained constant for Cohorts 1 and 2, as
predicted. Also consistent with theory. Stage 4 scores for Cohort 3 were significantly
lower in 1988 than either Cohort 1 s or Cohort 2’s scores. Cohort 3’s scores significantly
changed from 1988 to 2000 on Stage 5. In contrast, scores on this stage for Cohorts 1
and 2 remained the same. Consistent with expectations. Cohort I’s 1988 scores on this
stage were higher than Cohort 3’s.
Age-time x cohort-time effects. Significant age-time x cohort-time interaction
effects emerged for stages 3, 4, and 8. In the cohort-sequential analysis of Cohorts 1 and
2 ages 20 to 42, Cohort 1 showed significant increases on Stage 3 over this age range
whereas Cohort 2 did not. This is consistent with predictions and provides evidence for
social historical influence at time of testing. A significant interaction effect also emerged
for Stage 4 in the cohort-sequential analysis of Cohorts 1 and 2 for ages 20 to 42. Both
Cohorts 1 and 2 showed significant increases in Stage 4 scores from age 20 to age 42. In
addition. Cohort I’s Stage 4 scores at age 20 were significantly lower than Cohort 2’s
Stage 4 scores at this age. Lastly, as revealed in the cohort-sequential analysis of
Cohorts 1 and 2 from ages 31 to 42, Cohort 1 showed a significant decline in Stage 8
scores whereas Cohort 2’s scores over this range did not change significantly. Cohort 1
also had higher Stage 8 scores at 3 1 years of age than Cohort 2 did at 3 1 years of age.
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CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS AND CONTEXTUAL DISCUSSION
Discussion
The present study examined psychosocial development in three cohorts of men
and women. The principal focus of this investigation was on testing the psychosocial
maturity hypothesis, which is based on two interrelated postulates: a) personality is
expected to change in adulthood, and b) change should reflect increasing psychosocial
resolution. Results of this investigation provide mixed support for this hypothesis. On
the one hand, patterns of personality change were evident; on the other hand, the
majority of this change took place in early adulthood between the ages of 20 and 3 1
.
Although change was detected on the IPD across all age ranges tested, it appears on the
basis of these data that personality becomes increasingly stable in middle adulthood.
Both mean-level stability and rank-order consistency estimates showed greater
change in the decades of the 20s and 30s and considerably less change in the decade of
the 40s. However, because data were available only for Cohort 1 during the decade ot
the 40s, this stability maybe cohort specific. Cohort 3 showed increases during its 20s on
Stages I, 4, and 5, and Cohorts 1 and 2 showed increases during their 20s on Stage 4. In
the decade of the 30s, Cohort I’s scores decreased on Stage 8 and increased on Stages 1,
2, 3, and 4, and Cohort 2’s scores showed a marginal increase on Stage 4. However, in
the decade of the 40s, for which data were available only tor Cohort 1, the only
significant change in IPD stage scores was a decrease on Stage 3. Rank-order
consistency estimates over the various age-time intei’vals available suggest a similar
pattern. The highest test-retest correlations were for Cohort 1 between the ages ot 42
and
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54 (.71) and for Cohort 2 between the ages of 3 1 and 42 (.59). Consistent with the work
of Costa and McCrae (1994; 1997) and Roberts and DelVecchio (2000), these test-retest
correlations indicate the rank ordering of scores in midlife remains relatively consistent
over time. They further support the age 50 hypothesis, which claims that personality
becomes increasingly consistent and stable in middle adulthood (Roberts & DelVecchio,
2000).
There are a number of possible explanations for these findings. The most evident
one is that there may be striking similarities between the IPD and other trait measures of
personality such as the NEO-PI-R (McCrae & Costa, 1990). That is, there maybe higher-
order factors that the 8-stage IPD is tapping, which reflect basic trait dimensions of
personality. Positive resolution of the industry versus inferiority stage, for example, may
tap the underlying dimension of Conscientiousness. Items on the IPD that measure
industry such as “conscientious and hard-working” and “excel in my work” are similar
to bipolar descriptors used to assess trait levels of Conscientiousness (e g., lazy-hard-
working and negligent-conscientious). Positive resolution of the intimacy versus
isolation stage may tap the underlying trait dimension of Extraversion. Intimacy items
ask respondents to rate themselves on their level of candidness, warmth and friendliness,
sympathy for others, and comfort in personal relationships, which is similar to
Extraversion, a trait which consists of bipolar descriptors such as loner-joiner, quiet-
talkative, and affectionate-reserved. Other IPD stages may also be tapping basic trait
dimensions. For example, generativity resolution has been found to positively correlate
with the basic trait dimension of Openness to Experience (Bradley & Marcia, 1998). As
a result, the stability observed in the present study may reflect underlying trait
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dimensions, which have been shown to remain stable in middle adulthood (Costa &
McCrae, 1994; Costa & McCrae, 1997).
McAdams (1994) argues that stability and change depend on the level of
personality that is examined. According to McAdams, at the dispositional trait level,
considerable stability is expected because traits are conceptualized and operationalized
in global terms and are not contingent on life experiences. However, change becomes
increasingly apparent at the personal concerns level, which contains a person’s strivings,
mechanisms of defense, and coping styles. Change becomes even more apparent at the
life narrative level, which concerns an individual’s creation of his or her life story.
Furthermore, McAdams (1992) argues that trait personality research it is not specific
enough to predict behavior in specific circumstances, unable to generate causal models
of human behavior, disregards the contextual and conditional nature of human
experience, reduces the individual to a set of scores on a series of linear dimensions, and
forces respondents to adopt an objective/observer attitude toward themselves. Because
many of these criticisms are applicable to this research and the IPD, it is possible that the
present study was also biased toward stability.
The present findings support the notion that personality becomes increasingly
stable and consistent in middle adulthood. An alternative explanation is that these data
reflect sociohistorical influence. Many of the changes observed in Cohort 1 between
ages 31 (1977) and 42 (1988) were not observed in Cohort 2 between ages 31 (1988)
and 42 (2000) suggesting time of testing effects. The absence of findings involving
Cohort 2, however, may in all likelihood reflect lack of power as only 30 of
the 73
respondents from the 2000 follow-up participated in all testings. Furthermore, the
only
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significant change in Cohort I’s scores from age 42 (1988) to age 54 (2000) was a
decrease in Stage 3 scores. Until this finding is replicated in another cohort, it will
remain unclear whether this decrease reflects age-related change or time of testing
influence. Consequently, the lack of change for both Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 between the
1988 and 2000 testings may reflect stability in the environment as opposed to stability in
personality.
America is a nation of consumers and the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA)
can be seen as a state index of our national economic confidence. During the 1990s, the
DJIA has seen a steady increase from approximately 3,000 in 1991, just after the
recession of 1990, to approximately 1 1,000 at the time of the 2000 follow-up. This
economic growth and security enjoyed by Cohorts 1 and 2 in the 1990s may have been
reflected in their 2000 IPD scores. However, the political scandals that marred the
United States during the second term of the Clinton administration is as much a reason
as any to expect the IPD to reflect change on stages such as integrity versus despair.
Given the fit of the present findings with previous research on midlife personality
stability, economic security during the 1990s seems to be an unlikely explanation for the
personality stability demonstrated by middle age adults in the 2000 testing. Economic
security also does not adequately account for the Cohort I’s decrease from 1988 to 2000
in initiative versus guilt. A more likely explanation is that initiative versus guilt (playful
and adventuresome) taps a dimension of Extraversion (social interaction), which has
been found to decrease from young to middle adulthood (Costa & McCrae, 1994, 1997).
In contrast to Cohorts 1 and 2, Cohort 3 showed considerable change during the
1990s on Stages 1, 4, and 5. These changes replicate increases on Stages 4 and 5 that
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were observed for Cohorts 2 and 3 from college to age 3 1 . The same pattern of increases
for Cohorts 1, 2, and 3, which traversed the decade of the 20s in the 1960s, 1970s, and
1980s, respectively, provides strong support for true age-related change in psychosocial
resolution. Furthermore, these findings join other related research demonstrating
substantial change in personality during the decade of the 20s (Costa & McCrae, 1997).
The alternative explanation that Cohort 3’s changes reflect time of testing seems
implausible given the fit of these data with past research.
The second goal of this study was to determine whether changes in IPD stage
scores were consistent with Eriksonian theory. In the 2000 cross-sectional analysis, only
Stage 2 yielded a significant main effect of age-cohort. Cohort I’s 2000 scores were
higher than Cohort 2’s or Cohort 3’s. Although consistent with the psychosocial
maturity hypothesis (i.e., greater psychosocial resolution accompanies increasing age),
this finding is confounded by cohort differences and cannot be interpreted to reflect
differences based on age. Cohort 1 also scored higher on Stage 8 than Cohort 2 did in
the time lag analysis of 3 1 year-olds and in the cross-sequential analysis of scores
between 1988 and 2000. This finding is also consistent with theory in that adults in their
mid 50s would have had more opportunity to achieve greater wholeness, meaning in life,
and connection with others than adults in their early 40s. However, the fact that Cohort 1
scored higher on Stage 8 at age 3 1 than Cohort 2 scored on Stage 8 at age 3 1 suggests
cohort differences are confounding the effects of age. As a result, although these
findings are consistent with Erikson’s theory, they are confounded by cohort differences.
Cohort 3, however, showed expected gains on Stages 4 and 5 from age 20 to age
3 1 replicating increases observed on this stage for Cohorts 1 and 2 over the same age
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range. This provides substantial support for the saliency of industry and identity
conflicts in young adulthood. Cohort 3, however, also increased from age 20 to age 3
1
on Stage 1, which is unsurprising given previous follow-ups but not predicted on the
basis of theory. Interestingly, Cohort 1 showed increases on Stage 1 from age 31 (1977)
to age 42 (1988). Cohort I’s scores also significantly decreased on Stage 3 from age 42
to age 54, which is inconsistent with the psychosocial maturity hypothesis and
Eriksonian theory. While these findings are mixed with respect to the timing of
psychosocial crises in adulthood, they do not support an orderly sequence of stage
resolution. They are consistent, however, with Whitboume’s reworking of Erikson’s
theory based on the 1988 follow-up of the present sample (Whitbourne et al., 1992).
According to this view, the sequencing of Erikson’s stages is not unidirectional and
there is not an epigenetic unfolding of developmental issues. As Whitbourne et al.
explain, “all psychosocial issues can reach ascendancy at any particular time in the
individual’s life, depending on unique factors specific to that individual’s biological,
psychological, or social trajectories” (p. 270).
Perhaps most surprising was the paucity of changes on Stage 7, generativity
versus stagnation, which is theorized to come to ascendancy in midlife. Support for
positioning the generativity crisis in midlife, however, has been mixed. For example,
Vandewater and McAdams (1989) found no age-related change in generativity in a
sample ranging in age from 22 to 72. However, McAdams, de St. Aubin, and Logan
(1993) used a stratified random sampling procedure to investigate generativity in young
(ages 22-27), middle (ages 37-42), and older (ages 67-72) adults and found a significant
quadratic trend emerged with middle-adults scoring higher than young and older
adults
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on generative concern and action. Older adults, however, scored higher than middle age
adults on generative commitment and narration, and young adults scored lowest on these
indexes of generativity, complicating the issue of when generativity concern becomes
most salient in adulthood.
Recently, Stewart and Vandewater (1998) proposed a life span developmental
model of generativity. According to the authors, generative desires or goals are
expressed in young adulthood, a felt capacity for generativity and the confidence that
one can be generative is developed in middle adulthood, and in later adulthood, a feeling
of generative accomplishment is experienced. Stewart and Vandewater examined this
model in a longitudinal study of college educated women measured at four different
points in time (ages 21, 24, 35, and 47). Consistent with their model, expressions of
generative desire were highest at age 24, next highest at 21, and lowest at ages 35 and
47. It seems reasonable to suspect that the IPD is insensitive to the various ways
generativity can be expressed over the life course.
Peterson and Stewart (1993) provided evidence that generative issues are a
concern for young adult men and women (M = 28 years old). According to these
researchers, an opposite relationship between generativity and social motives emerged
for men and women. For young women, the power motive was related to parenting and
the achievement motive was related to personal productivity and societal concern. For
young men, the power motive was related to personal productivity and there was a
trend
for the achievement motive to be related to parenting involvement. With respect to
the
present investigation, longitudinal analyses between 1988 and 2000 on Stage
7 for
Cohorts 1, 2, and 3 did not yield a significant difference
between parents and non-
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parents. The small number of non-parents in each cohort, however, in these exploratory
analyses may have precluded making statistical comparisons. It is interesting to note that
the only significant changes on generativity were observed in the 1988 follow-up with
both Cohorts 1 and 2 decreasing on Stage 7 from 1977 to 1988. Given Stewart and
Vandewater’s (1998) analysis, it is possible that the change from 1977 to 1988 reflected
decreases in generative accomplishment, which is what is traditionally meant by
generativity, while felt capacity and generative desire remained untapped by the IPD.
Another interpretation is that the absence of findings on Stage 7 reflected low
subscale reliabilities, e g., .52, .37, and .49 for Cohorts 1, 2, and 3, respectively. These
low subscale reliabilities may have resulted because generativity is not a simple unitary
construct. McAdams and de St. Aubin (1992) construe generativity as a contextual,
multidimensional, and psychosocial construct that consists of seven interrelated
elements: cultural demand, inner desire, generative concern, belief in the species,
commitment, generative action, and personal narration. The distinguishing feature of this
model is that it covers the motivational (inner desire and cultural demand), behavioral
(action), and cognitive (concern, belief, and commitment) components of generativity;
furthermore, it invokes the notion of a life-story or personal myth (generative narration)
that may bind the aforementioned components together.
Bradley (1997; Bradley & Marcia, 1998) recently proposed a five-category
generativity status model describing five possible combinations of self-other
involvement that can occur during the generativity versus stagnation stage. Generative
adults are involved in their careers, interested in the development of young people, and
concerned about global societal issues. Conventional adults are generative in the sense
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they are truly concerned with young adults and believe they require firm guidance.
However, this style of generative resolution is also characterized by a restricted
worldview and difficulty deviating from established rules, values, and expectations.
Agentic adults are highly self-involved but do not show much involvement in others,
whereas communal adults are highly involved in others but do not show much
involvement in themselves as contributing to the next generation. Stagnant adults
represent the lowest form of generative resolution and are characterized by low
involvement and inclusivity in the self and others. Taking the Bradley’s model together
with Stewart and Vandewater’s (1998) developmental perspective, it is likely that the
generativity scale on the IPD is not capturing the multiple paths to generativity
resolution and the various dimensions of generative expression throughout the life span.
This study also examined a third question; To what degree does personality
change in adulthood reflect true age-related change or sociohistorical influence? The
results of this study provide evidence for both age-related change (i.e., two or more
cohorts showing similar patterns of change over the same age range) and environmental
influence (i.e., two or more cohorts showing dissimilar patterns of change over the same
age range). Strong evidence for age-related psychosocial progression was obtained for
Stage 4 during the decades of the 20s and 30s. All cohorts showed significant increases
on Stage 4 between the ages of 20 and 3 1 and Cohorts 1 and 2 showed similar increases
on this stage between the ages of 3 1 and 42. Cohort 2’s increase on Stage 4 from 3 1 to
42 was marginally significant (p < .071), which most likely reflected a lack of power.
Cohort 3 also showed marked increases on Stage 5 between the ages of 20 and 3 1
.
Similar increases on Stage 5 between the ages of 20 and 3 1 were observed for Cohorts 1
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and 2 in the 1988 follow-up (Whitbourne et al., 1992) and were indicated in the
univariate effects of age-time in the cohort-sequential analyses in the present study.
These changes provide strong evidence for continued developmental progression in
industry and identity resolution in young and middle adulthood.
Evidence for sociohistorical influence on personality development comes from
different patterns of ego integrity resolution for Cohorts 1 and 2 between the ages of 3
1
and 42. From 1977 to 1988, Cohorts 1 and 2 showed sharp declines in ego integrity
scores that were hypothesized to reflect general erosion in American philosophical
values resulting from the materialist culture of the 1980s (Whitbourne et al., 1992).
Given the economic growth and security that occurred during the 1990s and the Clinton
administration’s greater commitment to social welfare programs, it was expected in this
study that Stage 8 scores would increase from 1988 to 2000. Although scores did
increase for both cohorts over this time interval, these increases were non-significant.
However, there were differential patterns of change on ego integrity scores over the 3 1-
42 year old age range for the two cohorts. That is. Cohort 1 decreased in ego integrity
resolution from age 3 1 to age 42 and Cohort 2’s scores on this stage remained stable.
This differential pattern implies the presence of sociohistorical influence with the
materialist 1980s depressing Cohort I’s integrity scores and the economic security of the
1990s contributing to Cohort 2’s stable integrity scores.
A fourth goal of this investigation was to examine gender differences in
psychosocial development. It was hypothesized on the basis of previous follow-up
studies that there would be few gender differences and that the differences observed
would favor women. This hypothesis was supported. Women showed greater
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psychosocial resolution on Stage 4 (industry versus inferiority). Stage 6 (intimacy versus
isolation), and Stage 7 (generativity versus stagnation) in the time lag analysis oflPD
scores at age 3 1 and in the cohort-sequential analyses for all cohorts ages 20 to 3
1
Gender differences were not observed in Cohorts 2 and 3 at age 42 or in Cohort 1 at age
54.
The gender differences observed for Stages 6 and 7 are not surprising due to
differences that exist in socialization between men and women. Cross and Madson
(1997), summarizing a substantial body of work, cite the following examples of gender
differences in socialization: (a) parents are more likely to discuss emotions with girls
than boys; (b) girls’ groups beginning at age 3 are characterized by intimate friendships
and cooperation whereas boys’ groups are characterized by competitiveness and rough
play; and (c) parents are more likely to assign girls child care responsibilities than boys,
and consequently, women in U.S. society are more likely to take on child care
responsibilities. As a result. Cross and Madson argue that self-construal in the United
States is different for men and women. Women’s self-concepts are characterized by
interdependence whereas men’s self-concepts are characterized by independence.
Interdependence is conceptualized as self-definition that is based on one’s relationships
and group membership, harmony with others, and is principally concerned with
connection. Independent self-construal is based largely on autonomy, uniqueness,
distinction, and separateness from others. Thus, women seek close relationships
(intimacy) and close contact with children (generativity) because responsibility for the
other and attunement to the other’s feelings are central to interdependent self-construal.
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Women also scored higher on Stage 4 (industry versus inferiority), which is
concerned with ambition, productivity, and the work ethic. It is possible that women
scored higher on this stage because of the greater challenges associated with work for
women in our society. According to Bums (1996), employed women earn considerably
less than employed men, jobs predominantly held by women earn lower pay than jobs
predominantly held by men, the majority of society’s most prestigious jobs are held by
men, and women are poorly represented in government. This significant social
inequality may have spurred the women of Cohorts 1, 2, and 3 on in the development of
greater industry resolution. Using this logic, it might be expected that men would score
higher on intimacy and generativity, which was not the case. This argument, however, is
contingent on men accepting intimacy and generativity issues as challenges, which is not
self-evident. Indeed, men with independent self-constmals may find intimacy
threatening to their autonomy and self-esteem and, therefore, may shy away from
emotionally close and intimate relationships (Cross & Madson, 1997). In contrast,
women have clearly accepted the challenge of negotiating work and child rearing
responsibilities, as the majority of American women are part of the paid labor force.
Limitations of the Study
There were several constraints limiting the conclusions that can be drawn from
the present investigation. First, it is possible that attrition has substantially compromised
the internal validity of the findings. According to Roberts and DelVecchio (2000), high
attrition rates bias research findings in longitudinal studies toward stability, because
the
people who remain in longitudinal studies are by definition stable. Furthermore, attrition
rates increase as a function of the length follow-up interval with smaller
intervals finding
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greater stability and longer intervals finding greater change. Roberts and DelVecchio did
not find any effect of attrition in their meta-analysis of 1 52 studies, and concluded that
researchers should question the assumption that attrition is a major distorting influence
in longitudinal studies. In this study, significant effects were not observed in the overall
multivariate analyses used to test attrition effects indicating that the pattern of scores for
those who remained in the study and those who did not were not significantly different.
Although attrition effects were not observed for any cohort, only 55 of the
original 292 Cohort 3 participants were successfully followed in the 2000 testing. It is
possible that the survey method used in the present study resulted in low return rates but
this seems unlikely for several reasons. First, lower than expected return rates were not
observed in Cohorts 1 and 2. Although only 54 Cohort 1 and 30 Cohort 2 respondents
had participated in all of the follow up testings, the number of respondents in the 2000
testing for these cohorts were similar to the number of respondents followed in the 1988
testing. Second, the survey procedures used in this study closely followed those
suggested in the literature (Weathers, Furlong, & Solorzano, 1993). However, it is worth
noting that the survey method employed in the present study diverged from these
suggestions in several ways. For example, business reply envelopes were used as
opposed to first-class postage. Theoretically, first class postage increases the amount of
personal attention invested in potential respondents, encouraging greater response rate.
Although the majority of survey researchers (66.7%) use hand-signed cover letters to
increase personalization (Weathers et al., 1993), the present study used photocopied
cover letters. Weathers and her colleagues, however, did not find that hand signed
cover
letters predicted increased response rates. The response rate for Cohort 3 may
have also
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been compromised because this study did not use pre-paid monetary incentives.
According to Weathers review of the literature, the pre-paid monetary incentive is a
cost-effective method of increasing response rates in follow-up mailings. Nevertheless,
only 2 out of 34 studies in her analysis of survey methods in counseling psychology used
pre-paid incentives. The use of pre-paid monetary incentives was precluded in the
current investigation because of insufficient funding.
Based on the above considerations, it seems likely that the low return rate for
Cohort 3 may be generationally specific. The average age of Cohort 3 respondents was
31.93 making it part of what has been called Generation X, after Douglas Coupland’s
(1991) novel. Generation X: Tales for an Accelerated Culture . Most people define
Generation X as consisting of Americans bom between the mid 1960s and early 1980s.
The majority of Cohort 3 respondents were bom during the Vietnam War, which divided
the United States and cost it considerable international prestige. They were raised in the
1970s and 1980s, a time in U.S. history when economic prospects were low, jobs were
lost, and politics were marred by scandal. For the first time, Americans began talking of
“downward” as opposed to “upward” social mobility. With women’s increasing
dissatisfaction with homemaking and men’s unwillingness to contribute to managing
household responsibilities, Generation X developed a symbiotic relationship with
television, and was largely expected to care for itself, giving rise to the phenomena of
“latchkey kids.” Furthermore, Generation X saw increases in divorce rates forcing its
members to cope with unstable and broken homes as was tme for no other generation
before. As a result. Generation X was seen as inheriting a bleak world, which may have
contributed to it being notoriously uninterested in politics, suspicious of
institutions,
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skeptical of political leaders, and cynical. Given that salience of the topic under
investigation to the respondent is one of the two most important predictors of response
rate in survey research (Weathers et al., 1993), it is possible that Cohort 3’s low return
rate reflects an overall feeling of disconnection indicative of Generation X. Indeed, the
major source of follow-up address information for this study was obtained from the
University of Rochester alumni directory, which did not have updated records on the
majority of Cohort 3 participants from the 1988 testing, who presumably did not
maintain contact with university alumni office. This is consistent with the disconnection
hypothesis.
This study was also limited because it exclusively relied on a single self-report
measure. Relying exclusively on self-report instruments produces surplus construct
irrelevancies that cannot be dissociated from the measurement of the target construct
(Cook & Campbell, 1979). The sample of the present study also allows for limited
generalization as it consisted of White, educated, middle-class and upper-middle class
men and women from the University of Rochester. Although this kind of sample is
typical of longitudinal studies, homogeneity with respect to ethnicity and SES does not
allow for generalization beyond the traditional 4-year White college student.
Social desirability may have also played a role in the present findings. Socially
desirable responding refers to the willingness to acknowledge only those aspects of the
self that an individual believes to be favorable. Given the positive and negative
dimensions that contribute to each IPD stage score, it seems possible that socially
desirable responding may have been an issue. However, Costa and McCrae
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(1994) maintain that social desirability is not as serious a contaminant as researchers
once thought. According these authors, a substantial body of work has now
demonstrated that individual differences in the propensity to endorse socially desirable
items are weak compared to individual differences in traits. Indeed, social desirability
shows very little effect on the factor structures of personality measures when groups of
honest and socially desirable responders are compared (Ellingson, Brent Smith, &
Sackett, 2001). More importantly, however, Whitboume and Waterman (1979) assessed
the impact of socially desirable responding by correlating IPD stage scores with the
Marlowe-Crowne (M-C) Social Desirability Scale in the 1977 follow-up. According to
these researchers, correlations between the M-C social desirability scale and Stages 1-6
of the EPD ranged from . 16 to .28 for college students and .05 to .20 for alumni,
suggesting that the IPD is relatively insensitive to social desirable response bias. As a
result, social desirability did not appear to significantly limit this investigation’s
findings.
Future Research
This study presents important findings on several key facets of Erikson’s
psychosocial crisis theory in particular and personality stability and change in general. It
also provides information as to when personality change occurs and does not occur and
whether change is related to ontogenetic development or environmental influences.
Immediately apparent, however, is the need for future research examining the
relationship between the IPD and trait measures of personality such as the NEO-PI-R.
First, it would be instructive to compare the factor structures of the two measures to
investigate the possibility that the IPD is tapping several facet scales of the
NEO-PI.
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Second, longitudinal and cross-sectional sequence studies could be conducted with the
aim of comparing mean-level and rank-order consistency estimates for the two scales
over time.
Although the EPD is not a trait based measure, it appears it may have something
in common with trait measures. One of the criticisms of the trait approach is its lack of
appreciation for context and life events (McAdams, 1994). A related criticism of the trait
approach is its lack of process oriented mechanisms that adequately account for how
personality changes and how people react to and influence their experiences in the world
(Whitboume, in press). A similar critique can be leveled against the present study.
Indeed, it has little to say with respect to what processes people use to maintain stable
personalities in adulthood. A productive next step would be to adopt a process oriented
approach such as Whitboume’ s (1996) identity process perspective. The incorporation of
this perspective would allow for speculation regarding the ways in which psychosocial
crises are resolved and incorporated into the self in the service of personality stability.
If the order of psychosocial stage resolution is not fixed, which the results of this
study suggest, then psychosocial crisis resolution or movement through the stages is
explicitly dependent on a person’s life circumstances and the environmental influences
acting on his or her life. Future research using the IPD should follow the work of
Mroczek and Spiro (2001) in applying statistical techniques such as two-level growth
curve modeling. The first level of this approach allows the researcher to assess
interindividual differences in intraindividual change by estimating change trajectories
for each person. The second level of this approach allows the researcher to build in, for
example, life event variables that are theorized to account for individual differences
in
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trajectories. It is apparent from the present study that polarizing adult personality
development into the extremes of stability versus change is no longer useful. The
appropriate question to ask is not whether a group of individuals changes or remains
stable over time, or whether the relative ranking of individuals within a group remains
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Means and Standard Deviations of IPD Stage Scores by Cohort and Time of Testing
Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3
Scale 1966 1977 1988 2000 1977 1988 2000 1988 2000
Stage 1
M 9.77 10.94 11.48 12.68 9.95 11.80 11.78 9.61 12.39
SD 7.77 8.29 8.13 8.63 7.39 7.30 7.20 8.04 7.84
Stage 2
M 8.22 8.15 8.94 9.47 7.21 7.69 7.43 6.76 7.48
SD 4.85 5.84 5.00 5.28 5.66 4.74 4.39 5.44 5.47
Stage 3
M 10.53 11.01 12.64 10.58 10.80 12.31 11.34 10.62 12.35
SD 6.78 7.09 7.04 7.69 7.53 7.39 7.03 7.61 7.23
Stage 4
M 6.53 13.58 16.52 15.76 9.30 14.92 16.59 9.42 14.96
SD 8.22 7.78 7.01 7.68 8.73 7.09 6.89 9.20 8.22
Stage 5
M 7.38 9.71 10.39 11.03 7.40 9.74 10.82 7.32 10.47
SD 6.58 6.22 6.58 6.43 7.02 6.77 6.24 7.33 5.87
Stage 6
M 10.98 13.12 13.32 13.69 12.00 14.24 16.19 11.57 13.75
SD 6.89 7.02 7.06 7.20 7.50 7.91 6.44 8.21 6.25
Stage 7
M 8.90 9.58 8.27 7.51 9.03 9.84 6.95 8.71
SD 5.68 5.91 5.79 5.73 5.43 4.73 5.50 6.35
Stage 8
M 7.74 3.85 5.35 5.71 2.67 2.90 2.35 4.73
SD 7.83 8.12 8.35 7.47 7.93 7.85 8.45 8.19










Longitudinal - Cohort 1 (1966-2000)
Effect of age-time 54 .480 .0001
Longitudinal - Cohort 1 (1977-2000)
Effect of age-time 54 .539 .0001
Longitudinal - Cohort 2 (1977-2000)
Effect of age-time 30 .417 .0001
Longitudinal - Cohort 3 (1988-2000)
Effect of age-time 55 .633 .004
Cross-sectional 2000
Effect of age-cohort 234 .826 .0001
Time lag comparison, all cohorts, age 3
1
Effect of gender 293 .924 .004
Effect of cohort-time 293 .788 .0001
Time lag comparison. Cohorts 1 and 2, age 42
Effect of cohort-time 171 .894 .020
Cross-sequential, all cohorts, 1989-2000
Effect of cohort-time 139 .668 .0001
Effect of time-age 139 .823 .001
Effect of cohort-time x time-age 139 .796 .018
Cohort sequential, all cohorts, ages 20 -3
1
Effect of gender 292 .945 .013
Effects of cohort-time 292 .917 .017








Cohort sequential. Cohorts 2 and 3, ages 20-31
Effects of gender 137 .886 .047
Effects of age-time 137 .616 .0001
Cohort sequential. Cohorts 1 and 2, ages 20-42
Effect of cohort-time 128 .887 .024
Effect of age-time 128 .664 .0001
Effect of age-time x cohort-time 128 .908 .021
Cohort sequential. Cohorts 1 and 2, ages 31-42,
Effect of cohort-time 128 .750 .0001
Effect of age-time 128 .763 .0001
Effect of age-time x cohort-time 128 .848 .01
Note. Only significant main effects and interactions are reported.
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Table 5
Univariate Fs and Significance of Age, Cohort, and Time of Testing Comparisons
Stage
Analysis 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Longitudinal - Cohort 1
(1966-2000)
Effect of age-time
F (3,159) 3.356 3.077 3.013 34.15 2.405 2.401
E .020 .029 .032 .0001 .07 .07 — —
Longitudinal - Cohort 1
(1977-2000)
Effect of age-time
F (2,106) 3.842 4.517 3.292 6.757 1.039 1.638 1.405 7.520
E .025 .013 .041 .002 .358 .199 .25 .001
Longitudinal - Cohort 2
(1977-2000)
Effect of age-time
F(2,58) 1.205 .128 1.388 7.791 1.324 2.701 .487 2.906
E .307 .880 .258 .001 .274 .076 .617 .063
Longitudinal - Cohort 3
(1988-2000)
Effect of age-time
F(1,54) 5.447 .518 1.886 22.83 12.79 3.55 3.148 3.346




F (2,231) .242 5.373 .766 .521 .099 2.569 1.249 2.278






Analysis 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Time lag, all cohorts, age
31
Effect of gender
F (1,287) .071 .224 .288 4.783 1.101 9.411 6.341 2.176
P .790 .636 .592 .03 .295 .002 .012 141
Effect of cohort-time
F (1,287) .571 .880 1.056 1.342 .289 .872 .03 11.37
P .566 .416 .349 .263 .749 .419 .97 .0001
Time lag. Cohorts 1 and
2, age 42
Effect of cohort-time
F(l, 169) .045 3.644 1.262 .007 .109 5.164 .004 1.20





F(2, 136) 2.03 5.937 1.04 6.439 1.779 2.732 2.068 3.30
P .135 .003 .356 .002
.173 .069 .130 .040
Effect of time-age
F (1,136) 2.94 1.862 .644 14.47 7.142 1.40 .145
2.607
P .089 .175 .424
.0001 .008 .238 .704 .10
Effect of cohort-time
X time-age
F(2, 136) 1.205 .011 3.763 10.65
4.80 1.613 2.75 .432
D .30 .989 .026









F (1,288) .063 .438 .256 4.71 .598 5.37 — —
E .803 .509 .613 .031 .440 .021 —
Effect of cohort-time
F (2, 288) .095 1.775 .545 5.723 .014 1.00
E .909 .171 .581 .004 .986 .368 — —
Effect of age-time
F (1,288) 15.42 .134 3.810 111.9 37.95 22.00
E .0001 .714 .052 .0001 .0001 .0001 — “
Cohort sequential, ages
20-31, Cohorts 2 and 3
Effect of gender
F (1,134) .134 .223 .086 7.246 1.940 8.356 5.192 1.665
E .715 .638 .770 .008 .166 .004 .024 .199
Effect of age-time
F (1,134) 13.65 .160 3.77 52.35 24.63 11.99 6.73 .091
E .0001 .689 .054 .0001 .0001 .001 .011 .764
Cohort sequential, ages
20-42, Cohorts 1 and 2
Effect of cohort-time
F (1,125) 037 3.64 .110 1.81 .080 4.90







Analysis 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Effect of age-time
F (2, 250) 2.23 1.167 .527 37.18 4.52 8.33
P .110 .313 .591 .0001 .012 .0001
Effect of age-time x
cohort-time
F (2, 252) .367 .165 4.219 3.512 .018 .363
P .693 .848 .016 .031 .982 .696 — —
Cohort sequential, ages
31-42, Cohorts 1 and 2
Effect of cohort-time
F(l, 125) .004 3.21 1.32 .064 .105 4.563 .041 7.835
P .949 .076 .253 .801 .746 .035 .840 .006
Effect of age-time
F(l, 125) .808 2.40 .613 9.575 1.06 .022 .498 7.369
P .371 .124 .435 .002 .306 .883 .482 .008
Effect of age-time x
cohort-time
F(l, 125) .116 .328 2.29 .043 .002 .821 .080 9.516
P .734 .568 .132 .835 .962 .367 .778 .003

































Figure 1. Erikson’s (1963) epigenetic matrix including stage numbers and the




1966 1977 1988 2000
20 31 42 54
N = 347 N= 155 N = 99 N= 106
20 31 42
N = 298 00II N = 73
20 32
N = 292 N = 55
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Figure 4. Cohort 1 means for Autonomy versus Shame
and Doubt on the IPD.
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Figure 5. Cohort 1 means for Initiative versus Guilt on
the IPD.
Figure 6. Cohort 1 means for Industry versus









Figure 7. Cohort 1 means for Identity versus Identity
Diffusion on tlie IPD.
Figure 8. Cohort 1 means for Intimacy versus
Isolation on the IPD.
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Figure 9. Cohort 1 means for Generativity versus











Figure 10. Cohort 1 means for Ego Integrity versus












Figure 1 1 . Trust versus Mistrust means on the IPD













Figure 12. Autonomy versus Shame and Doubt












Figure 13. Initiative versus Guilt means on the IPD




Figure 14. Industry versus Inferiority means on the IPD









Figure 15. Identity versus Identity Diffusion means




Figure 16. Intimacy versus Isolation means



















Figure 17. Generativity versus Stagnation means




Figure 18. Ego Integrity versus Despair means












Figure 19. Trust versus Mistrust means by cohort and year
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Figure 20. Autonomy versus Shame and Doubt means
by cohort and year of testing for ages 20-31 on the IPD.



























Figure 21 . Initiative versus Guilt means by cohort
and year of testing for ages 20-31 on the IPD. Age at
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Figure 22. Industry versus Inferiority means by cohort
and year of testing for ages 20-31 on the IPD. Age at










Figure 23. Identity versus Identity Diffusion means by
cohort and year of testing for ages 20-31 on the IPD.




Figure 24. Intimacy versus Isolation means by cohort and
year of testing for ages 20-31 on the IPD. Age at time










Figure 25. Generativity versus Stagnation means by
cohort and year of testing for ages 20-31 on the IPD.
Age at time of testing indicated on figure.
Cohort 2
Cohort 3
Figure 26. Ego Integrity versus Despair means by
cohort and year of testing for ages 20 - 3 1 on the IPD.





Figure 27. Trust versus Mistrust means on the IPD for
Cohorts 1 and 2 for the age range 20-42. Age at time
of testing indicated on figure.
Cohort 1
Cohort 2
Figure 28. Autonomy versus Shame and Doubt means
on the IPD for Cohorts 1 and 2 for the age range 20-42.
























Figure 29. Initiative versus Guilt means on the IPD
for Cohorts land 2 for the age range 20-42. Age at
time of testing indicated on figure.
Cohort 1
Cohort 2
Figure 30. Industry versus Inferiority means on the IPD
for Cohorts land 2 for the age range 20-42. Age at











Figure 3 1 . Identity versus Identity Diffusion means
on the IPD for Cohorts land 2 for the age range 20-42.
Age at time of testing indicated on figure.
Cohort 1
Cohort 2
Figure 32. Intimacy versus Isolation means on the IPD
for Cohorts land 2 for the age range 20-42. Age at




Figure 33. Generativity versus Stagnation means on the IPD
for Cohorts 1 and 2 for the age range 31-42. Age at time
of testing indicated on figure.
-•- Cohort 1
Cohort 2
Figure 34. Ego Integrity versus Despair means on the
IPD for Cohorts 1 and 2 for the age range 31-42. Age at
time of testing indicated on figure.
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